HARRIET MORRISON (NEE BAAH) v. REGISTERED TRUSTEES VICTORY BIBLE CHURCH & OTHERS
2015
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- ANSAH JSC (PRESIDING)
- DOTSE JSC
- GBADEGBE JSC
- BENIN JSC
- AKAMBA JSC
Areas of Law
- Civil Procedure
2015
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The case is an appeal from the Court of Appeal's reversal of a High Court decision to summarily dismiss the plaintiffs' claims and grant judgment for the 1st defendant on its counterclaim. The core issue was whether the High Court correctly applied the principles for striking out pleadings seen as frivolous or an abuse of court processes. The Supreme Court confirmed the Court of Appeal's decision, holding that the plaintiffs' case, even though it appeared weak, raised sufficient issues of fact and law to warrant a full trial. The Supreme Court underscored the cautious use of summary dismissal and emphasized that such procedures are to be used sparingly and only in clear-cut cases. Justice Dotse dissented, arguing that the plaintiffs' case was an abuse of process and should have been dismissed. The principles of civil procedure, particularly related to striking out pleadings and the court's inherent jurisdiction, were central to the case.
JUDGMENT
GBADEGBE JSC:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal that reversed the decision of the trial High Court in the matter herein. By the decision of the trial court proceedings in the action herein were terminated summarily with the plaintiffs’ case being dismissed and judgment entered for the 1st defendant on its counterclaim. I have read the record of appeal in the matter herein and had regard to the respective briefs submitted to us by the parties through their counsel and in my thinking, the question for our decision today is whether in reversing the learned trial judge of the High Court, Accra, the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal correctly applied the settled principles of the court discernible from a collection of cases in applications brought under the rules of Court and the inherent jurisdiction to strike out pleadings and for stated reasons to either stay, dismiss, or enter judgment for a party to the proceedings in respect of which the objection has been taken to a defective pleading.
As the application was expressed in the notice of motion before the trial court to have been brought both under the rules of Court and the inherent jurisdiction, I commence my consideration by referring to the relevant provision of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, CI 46 under which such an application is authorised. By Order 11 rule 18(1), it is provided thus:
“The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order any pleading or anything in any pleading to be struck out on the grounds that
(a) It discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence or
(b) It is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or
(c) It may prejudice, embarrass, or delay the fair trial of the action, or
(d) It is otherwise an abuse of the processes of the Court and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly”
The Court also has as part of its innate jurisdiction the power to exercise the same powers but while in its power derived from the Rules of Court it cannot have regard to affidavit evidence, in its inherent jurisdiction it is enabled to consider evidence placed before it by way of affidavits. There appears to be an overlap between Order 11 rule 18 of the High Court Rules and the inherent jurisdiction but as in proceeding under the inherent jurisdiction the court may have regard not only to the pleadings or indorsement but affidavit evidence, it can be said that the scope of that jurisdiction is wider.
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