GRACE FYNN v. STEPHEN FYNN, CHRISTIANA OSEI
February 12, 2014
SUPREME COURT
CORAM
- WOOD (MRS.) CJ, (PRESIDING)
- ANSAH, JSC
- YEBOAH, JSC
- BONNIE, JSC
- AKAMBA, JSC
February 12, 2014
SUPREME COURT
CORAM
Try asking the following...
JUDGMENT
WOOD (MRS) C.J
This court has clearly set out the legal principles governing appeals against the concurrent findings of fact and conclusions of two lower courts. The principle is that ordinarily, a second appellate court, such as this honourable court, would not interfere with the findings of fact made by a trial court and confirmed on appeal by a first appellate court. A second appellate court would overturn such findings and conclusions only in exceptional cases. The circumstance under which such an intervention may be legally permissible or justifiable is borne out in such cases as:
Achoro and Another v. Akanfela and Another [1996-97] SCGLR 209, at 214 we reasoned that the finding would be interfered with where;
“It was established with absolute clearness that some blunder or error resulting in a miscarriage of justice, was apparent in the way in which the lower tribunals had dealt with the facts. It must be established, e.g., that the lower courts had clearly erred in the face of a crucial documentary evidence, or that the principle of evidence had not been properly applied; or that the finding was so based on erroneous proposition of law that if that proposition be corrected, the finding will disappear … It must be demonstrated that the judgments of the courts below were clearly wrong.”
Obrasiwa 11 and others v Otu and Another [1996-7] SCGLR 618, at 624 affirmed the above legal proposition.
In Kpakpo v Brown [2001-2002] SCGLR 876, we observed (at page) that where the findings and conclusions are supported by the record and no miscarriage of justice has resulted from the decisions; the second appellate court would have no choice but to confirm those findings and conclusions.
The following cases:
Musah v Musah [2011] SCGLR 819,
Fabrina Ltd v Shell Ghana Ltd [2011] SCGLR 429, at 449
Fosua and Adu –Poku v Dufie (Deceased) and Adu- Poku v Mensah [2009] SCGLR 310,
Gregory v Tandoh IV & Hanson [2010] SCGLR 971,
Obeng & Others v Assemblies of God Church, Ghana [2010] SCGLR 300 at 409 and
Mensah v Mensah [2012] 1SCGLR 300
bring out other circumstances under which a second appellate court’s interference would be justified. On each occasion, this court speaking through our respected brother Dotse JSC carved out some of the exceptions to the general rule of non interference. Our learned brother expressed the position thus in Obeng v Assemblies of God Church (supra):
“…where findings of fact have been made by a trial court
AI Generated Summary
In a second appeal before the Supreme Court of Ghana, Chief Justice Georgina Theodora Wood, writing for a unanimous panel, reiterated the narrow circumstances under which a second appellate court may disturb concurrent findings of fact of the High Court and Court of Appeal. The dispute concerned Store No. 18 at the Railway Quarters Shopping Mall in Kumasi, sold by the appellant’s husband (the 1st defendant) to the respondent for GHC40,000, after which the respondent took possession and registered with the Railway Traders Association. Claiming joint matrimonial ownership and lack of consent, the appellant sought to set aside the sale. The respondent asserted sole ownership by the husband and her status as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, supported by due diligence and testimony from the Railway Quarters Association. The Court held the appellant could not rely on the husband’s admissions to bind the respondent, failed to discharge her evidential burden, and that Mensah v Mensah and Quartson v Quartson did not apply. Finding the lower courts’ conclusions supported by the record, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.