2020
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
Dynamic Youth Movement of Ghana, an incorporated organization dedicated to youth empowerment, and its director Edward Tuttor filed a constitutional writ invoking the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under articles 2(1) and 130 of the 1992 Constitution. Their action challenged the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) for allegedly exceeding its mandate in a conflict‑of‑interest investigation into the Minister of Finance concerning government bond issuances largely purchased by Franklin Templeton Investment, emphasizing links involving Trevor G. Trefgarne, Enterprise Group Limited, and Data Bank Limited. CHRAJ issued a report dated 22 December 2018, applying article 284 and Supreme Court precedent. Plaintiffs sought declarations that CHRAJ contravened articles 287 and 130, expunction of parts of the report, and rulings that the Minister breached articles 286(1)(a), 78(3), and 284. Reaffirming jurisprudence from Akosah and subsequent cases, and Sophia Akuffo CJ’s guidance in Kpodo, the Supreme Court held that original interpretative jurisdiction requires ambiguity or conflict in constitutional text. Finding none and recognizing CHRAJ’s authority to investigate and apply existing interpretations, the Court dismissed the writ and directed that any remedies be pursued in appropriate forums.
AMEGATCHER, JSC:-
Dynamic Youth Movement of Ghana is an incorporated person registered under the laws of Ghana with the object of empowering the youth of Ghana through education, training and advocacy. Together with its director, Edward Tuttor, a citizen of Ghana, they instituted this writ exercising the powers vested in them under the provision in articles 2(1) and 130 of the Constitution, 1992. The constitutional provision vested persons the right to invoke the original jurisdiction of this court to seek an interpretation to or enforcement of any provisions of the Constitution. This writ is part of myriads of writs which the Supreme Court had been inundated with of late from individual and corporate bodies seeking to test the legality or otherwise of acts or omission of constitutional and administrative bodies and public office holders which they perceived to be inconsistent with or a contravention of provisions of the Constitution. Interestingly the predecessor constitution of 1979 also suffered from the same thirst. Some of these writs have played no mean role in shaping the jurisprudence of this court and extending the frontiers of constitutional law in this jurisdiction. Others, however, did not meet this test.
To the latter, provoked the formulation of a roadmap by the then Court of Appeal performing the functions of the Supreme Court some forty years ago to guide parties and practitioners think through the issues before them thoroughly before appearing in the apex court to seek an interpretation. That was the case of Republic v. Special Tribunal; Ex parte Akosah [1980] GLR 592. In that case, the roadmap was set out for triggering the interpretative jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the 1979 Constitution. At page 605 Anin JA speaking on behalf of the court stated that the original, interpretative jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would be invoked where under the following:
“(a) the words of the provision are imprecise or unclear or ambiguous. Put in another way, it arises if one party invites the court to declare that the words of the article have a double-meaning or are obscure or else mean something different from or more than what they say;
(b) rival meanings have been placed by the litigants on the words of any provision of the Constitution;
(c) there is a conflict in the meaning and effect of two or more articles of the Constitution, and the question is raised as to which provision shall prevail;
(d) on the face of the provisions,