July 19, 2023
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The Supreme Court of Ghana addressed whether section 141 of the Banking and Specialised Deposit-Taking Institutions Act, 2016 (Act 930), which directs aggrieved persons to arbitration, constitutes an exclusive remedy that precludes High Court jurisdiction over human rights and administrative justice claims. Shareholders of the affected institution challenged the Bank of Ghana’s revocation of their company’s licence, alleging violations of constitutional rights and seeking declarations, certiorari, mandamus, and injunctions. The High Court refused to strike out the motion; the Court of Appeal reversed, stayed proceedings, and referred the case to the Ghana Arbitration Centre. Authoring Justice PWAMANG, JSC held that section 141 does not expressly oust the High Court’s constitutional jurisdiction: arbitration is an alternative forum, and constitutional remedies remain available under Articles 33, 23 and 140. Distinguishing domestic tribunal review under section 140, and relying on precedents including Ex parte Peter Sangber-Dery and Ex parte SEC, the Court set aside the Court of Appeal’s decision and allowed the High Court to proceed.
PWAMANG JSC:-
My Lords, this appeal arises from a refusal by the High Court, Human Rights Division, Accra to strike out an originating motion that sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 33 of the Constitution, 1992. The objection to the Court’s jurisdiction was based on the argument that the motion sought remedies against the 1st respondent/appellant/respondent (1st respondent) in connection with the revocation of the licence of the 3rd respondent pursuant to the Banking and Specialised Deposit-Taking Institutions Act, 2016 (Act 930), which Act has provided for arbitration as the means by which any person aggrieved by the revocation of a licence may seek redress. The High Court held that the provision for redress through arbitration has not foreclosed remedy by invocation of article 33 of the Constitution but the Court of Appeal came to the conclusion that it does. Therefore, the issue for our decision in this appeal is whether arbitration as directed under Act 930 is the exclusive means of redress available to a person aggrieved by revocation of her licence.
The applicants/respondents/appellants (the appellants) are shareholders of the 3rd respondent whose licence was revoked by Bank of Ghana and a Receiver appointed. The appellants alleged that the process by which the licence was revoked occasioned breaches of their Human Rights guaranteed under the Constitution so they applied to the High Court for redress. By their amended motion they prayed for the following reliefs:
i. Adjudge and declare that by failing to take into account the indebtedness of the Government of Ghana, its Ministries Departments or Agencies to the 3rd applicant group, Gold Coast Advisors Limited or 3rd respondent company before concluding that 3rd respondent was insolvent and consequently revoking its specialised deposit taking license the 1st respondent has violated, is violating or is likely to violate the rights of 1st, 2nd and 3rd applicants and 3rd respondent to administrative justice, to property and to equality or non-discrimination.
ii. Adjudge and declare that by relating to the 1st respondent that the total indebtedness of the Government of Ghana, its Ministries, Departments or Agencies to the 3rd applicant group Gold Coast Advisors Ltd or the 3rd respondent company was thirty Million and three hundred and twenty nine thousand four hundred and eighty three Ghana cedis and eighty four pesewas (GH$30,329,483.84) when the Ministry of Finance kne