DIKYI & ORS v. AMEEN SANGARI INDUSTRIES LTD
1989
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- KPEGAH J
Areas of Law
- Contract Law
- Property and Real Estate Law
- Civil Procedure
- Corporate Law
- Evidence Law
- Equity and Trusts
1989
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
Kpegah J. ruled on a submission of no case after the plaintiffs evidence closed, addressing the scope of section 18 of Ghanas Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D. 175). The Nsona family challenged a 1975 lease granting 575 acres for 99 years to a company associated with the Sangari brothers, negotiated by Saied Ekow Sangari (later Nana Tandoh V), then a director and heir apparent. The leases consideration was only 500 cedis plus a sheep and schnapps annually, with no renegotiation, and the land served a palm plantation feeding the companys soap business. Defendants elected to stand or fall by a no-case submission and offered no evidence. Evaluating the plaintiffs case under s.18 and equitable principles, the court found the bargain unconscionable and set aside the lease, while awarding the defendants a2380,000 on their counterclaim based on plaintiffs admission.
JUDGMENT OF KPEGAH J.
This is a ruling on a submission of no case made by the defendants after the plaintiffs have closed their case. The ruling will involve a consideration of the scope and import of section 18 of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D. 175). Despite the relative old age of N.R.C.D. 175, this appears to be the first time that a major action of this type is being brought to invoke the provisions of section 18 of N.R.C.D. 175. I assume, although they did not say so, the efforts of both counsel had not been able to bring out any decision by our courts on the provision. This assumption is based on the fact that no decided case on [p.64] the section was brought to my notice by them; and my own efforts have revealed none. This ruling may therefore have some fascination but I am not sure if I will be able to adequately deal with the problem to satisfy expectations.
In this action, the plaintiffs are claiming a declaration that a lease dated 5 May 1975, and stamped in the Deeds Registry as No. C.C.L. 561/75, and executed between their family and the defendants’ company is unconscionable. Also, an order setting aside the said lease on grounds of unconscionability is being sought. By the said agreement or lease, the plaintiffs’ family leased to the defendants, for 99 years, a 575-acre farmland for palm plantation to support the defendants’ soap manufacturing business. The consideration for this lease is ¢500 plus one sheep and a bottle of schnapps per annum. The sheep and the bottle of schnapps are to be used for certain annual rites on the land. There is no clause in the lease which permits a periodic renegotiation of the consideration. The plaintiffs are claiming that the agreement is so unfair or hard on them that it qualifies to be considered as an unconscionable bargain involving land and should be set aside under section 18 of N.R.C.D. 175.
The plaintiffs’ case, briefly put, is that the defendants’ company obtained a lease from their Nsona family acting by the then occupant of the stool, Nana Tandoh IV. The lease, as I have said, is for 99 years and the rent is ¢500 plus one sheep and a bottle of schnapps. This agreement was executed on behalf of the family by Nana Tandoh IV and on behalf of the defendant company by the present occupant of the stool, Nana Tandoh V; he was at the time of execution of the lease the heir-apparent to the stool and was also a director-shareholder of the defendant company. When later the family realised that t