COOK v. KUTSOATSI AND OTHERS
1960
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- ADUMUA-BOSSMAN
- J
Areas of Law
- Civil Procedure
- Contract Law
- Property and Real Estate Law
1960
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The plaintiffs claim was dismissed as the Keta Native Court held jurisdiction over the matter since all material facts and transactions occurred within Keta. The judgment clarified that a cause of action involves all material facts necessary to constitute the claim and must be within the jurisdiction of the lesser court. Customary law compels the debtor to repay the creditor at their residence, thus Keta had the jurisdiction. The court also discussed the nature of the loan agreement, whether it constituted an equitable mortgage or a customary pledge but found the proceedings within the native court's jurisdiction.
JUDGMENT OF ADUMUA-BOSSMAN, J.
(His lordship referred to the facts and continued):
It is the sale in the foregoing circumstances which plaintiff's counsel contends was illegal, because he maintains, the Keta Court had no jurisdiction in respect of the action for debt, and its judgment and all subsequent proceedings were accordingly a nullity. His argument based on section 14 (3) of Cap. 98, is that the defendant was resident, or at any rate was in Saltpond, but not in Keta, when the debt became payable at the time stipulated in the document, and therefore it is the native court having jurisdiction over the Saltpond area which was the court legally and properly entitled, or vested with jurisdiction, to try the case.
It is perhaps unfortunate that such a highly technical expression or phrase as "the cause of action arose" has not been defined or explained in the Native Court Ordinance, Cap. 98, in a layman's language or in terms simple enough for the understanding of the type of persons, the large mass of simple illiterate persons, whom the native courts mostly serve. It falls therefore to try and ascertain or find out the meaning of the expression or phrase by reference to the law dictionaries. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (3rd Ed. Vol. 1 p. 424) defines "cause of action" as "the entire set of facts [p.98] that gives rise to an enforceable claim"; and Wharton's Law Lexicon (14th Ed. p. 168) defines the phrase as:—"A right to sue. All the facts which are necessary to establish the plaintiff's right to the remedy which he claims."
Even in the light of those definitions, it appears extremely doubtful whether the contention of learned counsel for the plaintiff can be well-founded, when he argues in effect that the falling due of the debt at the date stipulated for payment and default in payment, constitutes the "arising of the cause of action."
The next important enquiry is, in what circumstances is "a cause of action" said to arise. To ascertain the right answer or explanation, it appears necessary to refer to some of the English cases which have explained or interpreted the same expression used in some English statutes conferring limited jurisdiction (as does the Native Courts Ordinance, Cap. 98) on local courts.
In the case of Cooke v. Gill ((1873) L.R. 8 C.P. at p. 113) Bovil, C.J. said:
"The Lord Mayor's Court is clearly a court of inferior jurisdiction, and is subject to the general rules applicable to courts of that description, except in so far