ATTORNEY–GENERAL v. SALLAH
April 17, 1970
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- Amissah
- Siriboe
- Jiagge
- Anin and Achaer JJ.A
Areas of Law
- Constitutional Law
- Evidence Law
- Civil Procedure
April 17, 1970
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
Amissah J.A., writing for the majority, considered an Attorney‑General’s application to disqualify Justices Apaloo and Sowah from a high‑profile constitutional case brought by Sallah challenging Government’s construction of section 9(1) of the Transitional Provisions. The motion asserted Apaloo was an intimate friend of Sallah and Sowah had engaged on behalf of his brother‑in‑law, Mr. Jonas, formerly of the Lands Secretariat. After reviewing affidavits from the Attorney‑General and Minister Victor Owusu and testimony from Fleischer, the court adopted the ‘real likelihood of bias’ test, rejected hearsay and any lowered evidentiary standard, and found the intimacy allegations unproven. It cautioned that gossip cannot guide judicial independence and warned that unsubstantiated objections risk allowing litigants to choose judges. Siriboe J.A. dissented, viewing the matter from the reasonable litigant’s perspective and declining to remain on the original panel.
EXTRACTS FROM RULING:
Per Amissah J.A.: “Upon consideration, we reject this story as an infamous invention. It is a matter for concern that on an issue as grave as this and in a case of such importance when the reputation of a judge of the superior courts of the land is, in the conditions of the country, bound to suffer in some measure, whatever lawyers might say about the harmless nature of objections on the ground of bias, by a mere allegation however baseless it is, no prior attempt seems to have been made to check this story before it was given currency. It is even more disquieting when it is realized that the allegation was made through one who has the whole investigating machinery of the State at his disposal. Especially as the story was apparently first volunteered after objection had already been raised to the propriety of the particular judge concerned continuing to hear this important constitutional case.
When we dismiss, as we do, the story of these two dishonest and vicious rogues, we are left on this point with the evidence of Fleischer, and the admission of the respondent himself that he knew Justice Apaloo whose house he used to visit occasionally before he became a judge, which was in July 1960, and that since Justice Apaloo became a judge he, the respondent, had been to his house at Christmas 1965 and in 1966 when Justice Apaloo threw a party on the release of a detained relative. Finally there was the opinion volunteered by Mr. Victor Owusu, a Minister of State, that from his knowledge of both Justice Apaloo and the respondent he would describe their relationship as that of very close and intimate friends. We are bound to give the most serious consideration and to pay respect to the opinion of a Minister, but we would have wished for some factual statement of the basis of his opinion to enable us evaluate for ourselves the degree of friendship in order to determine if it would give rise to that likelihood of bias which the law should avoid. For the degree of relationship itself is in dispute and evidence on it has occupied several days of this court’s time. Unfortunately we had no such facts from the Minister.
Turning to Fleischer, it would be a sad day when we have to conclude that in the conditions of this country because a stores manager reserves some commodity for a customer, because that customer looks for and converses with the manager when he comes to the store and in a language which the observer does not understand, because th