ANANE AND OTHERS v. KRAH
1966
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- FRANCOIS J
Areas of Law
- Civil Procedure
- Property and Real Estate Law
1966
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The appeal aimed to invalidate a property ruling based on alleged procedural errors during the viewing of the land in question. The appellant conceded on facts but sought a retrial citing the Gblevi Family case's procedural guidelines. The court found that the plaintiff's evidence robustly supported land ownership, while the defendant's evidence was weak. The judgment emphasized that procedural errors in viewing the land did not necessitate a new trial. Citing several precedents, the court upheld the lower court's ruling and dismissed the appeal.
JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.
This appeal is solely to determine whether the viewing of the land in dispute was so incompetently done as to vitiate the entire proceedings. Learned counsel for the appellant conceded from the start that on the facts, there was everything against him but he urged that since the procedural requirements laid down in Gblevi Family v. Amanie,1 upon a local court's viewing of the locus in quo, had not been observed the appeal should be allowed and a trial de novo ordered so that a proper inquiry at the locus in quo could be made. I do not think this will serve a useful end for the following reasons.
The plaintiff gave a detailed account of the history relating to the acquisition of the land, its cultivation when a virgin forest, the parties to whom some parts were apportioned and other evidence about her occupation thereof. The plaintiff further called witnesses who formed boundary with her and the cumulative effect of their evidence was an impressive proof of the plaintiff's title. On the other hand the defendant admitted he was shown his boundary when the plaintiff's predecessor, a neighbour, was not present. The defendant's first witness could only state he was permitted by both the plaintiff and the defendant to tap palm wine. The defendant's second witness merely accompanied the parties to the land to check on the boundaries, but as the parties could not meet, the boundaries were not investigated. The defendant's third witness claimed to have a boundary with the plaintiff but stated as follows, "I do not know the boundary of the first defendant's land and the plaintiff." In those circumstances a view of the locus in quo was superfluous.
The magistrate has painstakingly considered the evidence and I agree with the conclusion he arrived at as to the plaintiff's title and I am not disposed to vary it. Though it may be preferable to have witnesses on a locus re-sworn to narrate their evidence in court upon re-assembling, I hold that it's non-observance is not always fatal.
In the case of Keteku v. Dzogbenuku2 Lingley J. laid down the principle as follows: "If the viewer is a member of the court it is sufficient if he makes a report that can be attached to the proceedings in writing. It is unnecessary for the report to be given on oath.”
[p.784]
The principle was quoted with approval in the case of Kwami and Kofi v. Adzonu.3 It should be noted that it was in that case that van Lare J.A. first enunciated the principle adopting th