AMPONG v. ABORAA
1960
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- SMITH, J
Areas of Law
- Native law and custom
- Slander and defamation
1960
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The plaintiff succeeded in his claim for slander based on native law and custom. The court awarded 50 in damages, recognizing that while the word 'slave' constitutes slander under native law, there was no evidence of special damage or that the plaintiff's candidature for the Akropong Stool had been jeopardised.
JUDGMENT OF SMITH J.
This is an action for £500 damages for slander. The slanderous words which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant used were "slave and beast."
I have no hesitation in accepting the evidence of the plaintiff's witnesses that the defendant did in fact call the plaintiff by these names. That being so, the question is whether this action is one which should have been tried in the native court and not in the Supreme Court. Counsel for the defendant relied on the case of Kwaku v. Addo (2 W.A. L.R. 306). He argued that if the action was founded on English law it should be dismissed, because there was no proof of any special damage; alternatively, if it was founded on native law and custom then the case was at variance with the writ of summons. I would have agreed with this latter contention, but the plaintiff before trial sought and was given leave to amend his statement of claim by adding another paragraph as follows:-
"The plaintiff maintains that by native law and custom the words published by the defendant constitute actionable slander."
I think that this amendment satisfied Order 19, Rule 31 of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954, and I hold that it makes the case clearly one based on native law and custom. There is therefore no reason in law why this court should not entertain the suit. The next question is whether the epithet "slave" by itself constitutes slander according to native law and custom. I think that there is no doubt that it does, and being universally regarded as such it required no further specific pleading. In my opinion the plaintiff is entitled to succeed in this case.
The measure of damages is difficult. The plaintiff claims as much as £500 for the very reason, as Mr. Blay (his counsel) points out, that times have changed since Sarbah's days, when the punishment for slander was public ridicule and a small fine. It is obvious nowadays that the matter can only be dealt with by awarding the slandered person sufficient pecuniary compensation, the amount depending, of course, on the position of the individual concerned and the circumstances of the case. On the other hand, as time has passed, the word "slave" may have lost a lot of its provocative nature. I should think that nowadays the expression may quite well not carry its former odium and disgrace, and the plaintiff admitted that he would have accepted an apology in the form of customary pacification. The plaintiff alleges in paragraph 4 of his state