AMEGASHIE v. OKINE

JUDGMENT OF LUTTERODT J.

Under the Land Title Registration Laws 1985 (P.N.D.C.L. 152) the contestants to title in any piece of land are first obliged to refer their dispute to the Lands Registry for adjudication by the Land Title Adjudication Committee.

Therefore, the plaintiff and the defendant who were involved in a dispute over a parcel of land situate and lying at Abelenkpe duly referred their case to the relevant body for adjudication. Each is said to have submitted her relevant documents.

The plaintiff, who alleges she was declared the registered proprietress of the said land by the Chief Registrar of Lands and was duly issued with land certificate No. GAO 542 dated 7 August 1990 sued the defendant (1) to recover that piece of land; (2) for an order of interim injunction to restrain him from further trespassing onto the land; and (3) [p.322] for damages for trespass.

It is the plaintiff’s contention that she has been compelled to adopt this line of action because in spite of the fact that she has an indefeasible title (certificate), the defendant has refused to yield up possession of the land.

When the defendant was served with the statement of claim, she did not merely file a defence but also counterclaimed for two reliefs:

"(1) An order that the purported grant of the land described in paragraph (7) of the claim by the Swaniker family to the plaintiff is null and void.

(2) A declaration that the certificate of title issued by the Land Title Registry to the plaintiff is null and void and of no effect."

Among the steps the defendant took thereafter was to file a motion for interim injunction restraining both parties, their servants and agents from interfering with the physical features of the disputed land or in any way dealing with it until the hearing and final determination of this suit.

At the hearing of the motion the plaintiff's counsel took a preliminary objection in law the substance of which was that the entire proceeding was not maintainable at law in so far as it sins against section 132 (2) of P.N.D.C.L. 152. His argument therefore was that the application for interim injunction was not only frivolous but without jurisdiction and the same ought to be dismissed in limine. The objection did not come as a surprise, for the plaintiff's counsel has carefully and clearly spelt out all the grounds on which he intended to oppose the motion, including the main ground which I have already outlined. The other grounds he argued in support