JUDGMENT OF AMISSAH J.A.
The point at issue here is narrow but neat. It is whether a letter written without prejudice by one party may be given in evidence to prove not a statement made with the object of compromising the action but to prove a signature in the settlement of a dispute. Public policy demands that statements made without prejudice in an attempt to settle a dispute be excluded as evidence in the case. The defendant in this case wants to prove to the court what he says his signature is, it being a matter in controversy. He puts forward in support of this objective a letter which he claims he signed. Counsel for the plaintiff objects to the production of the letter on the ground that it was written without prejudice. If the object of introducing the letter was to prove the content of the statements therein then without question counsel for the plaintiff would be right in his contention. It being the rule that a letter written without prejudice cannot be [p.416] looked at by the court without the consent of both parties. But is counsel right if the sole purpose of tendering the letter is to show the proper signature of a party? The law of evidence is familiar with many situations where an item may be inadmissible for one purpose but yet admissible for another. So that the rule excluding "without prejudice" statements may not be an absolute bar to the admission of the letter in dispute if it is otherwise admissible and its purpose is not to infringe that rule.
An interesting feature of this debate is that it is the writer of the letter who in normal circumstances would be prejudiced by its admission who puts it forward. But that in itself may not be a sufficient reason for its admission. We are reminded that in a similar situation Kindersley V.C. in Williams v. Thomas (1862) 2 Dr. & Sm. 29 considered that the term "without prejudice" contained in a letter meant that the writer of it must not be prejudiced by it, but that he did not think it followed that it was not competent to the writer to use it, although it could not be used against him. But this analysis was criticised by Lindley L.J. in the later case of Walker v. Wilsher (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 335 at p. 338, C.A. where the learned judge pointed out that Kindersley V.C. had overlooked the fact that the object of putting in that letter was to prejudice the opposite party by putting in the answer to it, thereby infringing the rule that all letters written in that series of negotiations would equ
