JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.
On 17 November 1966 this court gave leave to the plaintiff to amend her writ of summons and statement of claim which were filed together. I now set out to give my reasons for allowing the amendments.
The plaintiff's writ of summons and the statement of claim were filed on 10 October 1966 and the gravamen of the claim was for the return of the sum of £G12,700 from the defendants on the ground that the consideration had failed. This sum was evidenced by a promissory note dated 2 August 1966. Appearance to the writ of summons was entered by both defendants. On 29 October 1966 the plaintiff filed summons for judgment and the application was fixed for hearing on 9 November 1966. On 3 November 1966 the plaintiff filed an amendment to the writ of summons by adding a claim of eleven per cent interest on the sum claimed. On 8 November 1966 another amendment of the statement of claim was filed setting out in clear terms the position of the first and second defendants.
[p.756]
In granting the application for the amendments I had in mind the cardinal principle which is stated in Order 28, r. 1 of the Supreme [High] Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954,1 that "all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties." Thus in Cropper v. Smith,2 Bowen L.J. made these important remarks about amendments:
"Now I think it is a well established principle that the object of the courts is to decide the rights of the parties, and not to punish them for mistakes they make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with their rights ... I know of no kind of error or mistake which, if not fraudulent or intended to overreach the court ought not to correct if it can be done without injustice to the other party. Courts do not exist for the sake of discipline, but for the sake of deciding matters in controversy; and I do not regard such amendment as a matter of favour or grace . . . It seems to me that, as soon as it appears that the way in which a party has framed his case will not lead to a decision of the real matter in controversy, it is as much a matter of right on his part to have it corrected, if it can be done without injustice, as anything else in the case is a matter of right."
Bramwell J. had this to say in Tildesley v. Harper3:
"My practice has always been to give leave to amend unless I have been satisfied that the party applying was
