J U D G M E N T
JUDGE CARDINAL:
X is a retired lawyer who has suffered, or appears to have suffered, from Korsakoff’s syndrome, a mental illness related to the over-consumption of alcohol. Indeed, he would admit to drinking to excess since the breakdown of his second marriage to his wife, P, although records show excessive alcohol consumption well before that date. He presently resides at the V Care Home in Y area where he has resided since on or about 28 th May of this year. He had been admitted to the L Ward in Z Area on 18 th December last year and made subject to a section under section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983 as amended. From there he was transferred to the M Centre at A Area and detained under section 3 of the 1983 Act on 9 th January of this year. He was discharged from this six month section on 24 th April but has remained in hospital. An urgent authorisation was obtained on 1 st May and a standard authorisation to detain him on 13 th May. He moved to his present accommodation pursuant to my Order of 27 th May 2014, a place better suited for his particular difficulties.
X appealed that standard authorisation, hence the case being listed before me in late May. I made directions and sought a medical opinion from his treating doctor pursuant to section 49 of the 2005 Mental Capacity Act. However, by moving he needed a new standard authorisation and one was sought which was refused as a result of assessments by Dr. Loosemore and Miss Wright, the social worker. The capacity assessment prepared upon him says that X does not now lack capacity to make decisions as to his residence, medical and care needs; so I am faced with the difficulty of still not receiving the section 49 report. Nonetheless, it is appropriate to deal with whether X should continue to be detained.
This court has power under section 15 of the 2005 Act to make declarations as to X’s capacity to make decisions as to residence, et cetera, and the law is set out clearly in section 48 of the Act as to whether or not I should deem that he should be detained in the interim.
The leading case on that is the decision of Her Honour Judge Marshall in the case of Re: F [2009] E.W.H.C. B30, a decision followed by myself in S.M.B.C. v W.M.P. [2011] E.W.C.O.P. B13. In that latter case, referring to the former, I said this: “I approach the matter by respectfully concurring with the learned judge’s remark that, ‘What is required is simply evidence to justify a reasonable belief that P ma
