Szkwarkowski v Regional Court In Gdansk, Poland
2014
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
UK
CORAM
- SIR STEPHEN SILBER
Areas of Law
- Administrative Law
- Human Rights Law
2014
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
UK
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
Krzysztof Szkwarkowski appealed against his ordered extradition to Poland to serve a 10-month sentence for grievous bodily harm. He argued that his time on electronic curfew in the UK should count towards his sentence. The court required further clarification from Polish authorities who stipulated that only curfews of 12 hours per day would count towards sentence reduction. As the appellant only had a 7-hour daily curfew, the court concluded he had not served his sentence. The appeal was dismissed, finding no human rights violations sufficiently severe to bar extradition.
J U D G M E N T
SIR STEPHEN SILBER:
Introduction
Krzysztof Szkwarkowski (" the appellant") appeals against the decision of District Judge Coleman, made on 25 July 2014 at Westminster Magistrates' Court, by which the appellant's extradition to Poland was ordered in respect of a European Arrest Warrant issued out of the Regional Court in Gdansk on 7 April 2009. It was certified by the National Crime Agency in this country on 28 October 2013. The appellant's extradition is sought to serve a sentence of imprisonment of 10 months in respect of one offence of causing grievous bodily harm committed on 14 August 2005.
The district judge, according to the appellant, erred in ordering the appellant's extradition, as the sole ground that is being relied on is that the appellant has served his sentence, or almost served his sentence, taking into account the time spent on electronically‑monitored curfew and deducting that from the appellant's outstanding prison sentence.
When this case first came in front of me together with the accompanying case of Michalik CO/3744/2014, I was concerned as to how the Polish authorities would regard the time spent in this country on curfew, and in particular whether there would be any deduction forth appellant's sentence on account of the time spent on curfew.
The appellant had been subject to a curfew for 7 hours a day, and I was uncertain as to how that would be regarded by the Polish authorities. Obviously, if there would be a deduction of one day for each period of 7 hours spent on curfew, that would have a dramatic effect on the issue of whether the appellant had served his sentence.
There was a great shortage of information, and in this case, as in the case of Michalik , I posed various questions which were to be answered by the judicial authorities. They were whether credit will be given against sentences imposed in Poland to those awaiting extradition and who have been the subject intros country of an electronically‑monitored curfew of (a) 6 hours per day, (b) 7 hours per day, (c) 8 hours per day, (d) 9 hours per day,and (e) 10 hours per day, and, if so, how much deduction is given in each case.
The response was asked to set out the applicable law and practice, not only as regards the appellants but also in Polish extradition cases generally. In consequence, in both these cases, the different Judicial Authorities have submitted responses.
It is common ground that in England the period for which you have to be under cur