Miranda v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Ors
2014
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
UK
CORAM
- LORD JUSTICE LAWS
- MR JUSTICE OUSELEY
- MR JUSTICE OPENSHAW
Areas of Law
- Administrative Law
- Human Rights Law
- Criminal Law and Procedure
2014
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
UK
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
This case involves the detention of a Brazilian national at Heathrow Airport in 2013 by the Metropolitan Police under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000, due to suspicion of carrying encrypted materials linked to terrorism. The claimant challenged the legality, proportionality, and human rights implications of the stop. The court concluded that the stop was lawful, proportionate, and did not violate the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR. The court emphasized that the stop must uphold legal standards, particularly regarding national security.
Judgment
LORD JUSTICE LAWS:
INTRODUCTION
This case arises from the detention of the claimant by officers of the Metropolitan Police at Heathrow Airport on 18 August 2013, purportedly under paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 . He was questioned and items in his possession, notably encrypted storage devices, were taken from him. He says that all this was done without any legal authority.
The claim raises three questions. The first is whether, on the facts of the case, the power conferred by paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 to stop and question a person at a port or border area for the purpose of determining whether he appears to be “concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism” allowed the police to stop the claimant on 18 August. The second is whether, if it did, the use of the power was nevertheless disproportionate to any legitimate aim. The third is whether upon its true construction the paragraph 2(1) power is repugnant to the right of freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).
THE TERRORISM ACT 2000
S.1 of the Act of 2000 provides in part:
“(1) In this Act ‘terrorism’ means the use or threat of action where—
(a) the action falls within subsection (2),
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it—
(a) involves serious violence against a person,
(b) involves serious damage to property,
(c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action,
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.”
S.1(4) shows that neither the action, any victim, the public or the government are confined to events in connection with the United Kingdom.
S.40(1)(b):
“(1) In this Part ‘terrorist’ means a person who—
...
(b) is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.”
Schedule 5 is material to the argument on proportionality. It is given effect by s.37, which appears in Part IV of the Act, cross-headed “Terrorist Investigat