Judgment
Mrs Justice Rose DBE:
The Applicant (‘Mr Maud’) applies to set aside a statutory demand dated 5 June 2014 and served on him by the Respondents. The statutory demand is for an unsecured sum of £41,384,196.17 (€50,985,620.07). This sum comprises a judgment debt in the sum of €52,565,110.31 that Mr Maud was ordered to pay the Respondents in a consent order made by Teare J on 17 June 2011 plus interest accruing on that amount since that order, less the amount of security held by the Respondents for that debt.
The grounds on which the court may set aside a statutory demand are set out in the Insolvency Rules 1986 r. 6.5(4):
(a) The debtor appears to have a counterclaim, set-off or cross demand which equals or exceeds the amount of the debt or debts specified in the statutory demand; or
(b) The debt is disputed on grounds which appear to the court to be substantial; or
(c) It appears that the creditor holds some security in respect of the debt claimed by the demand; or
(d) The court is satisfied on other grounds, that the demand ought to be set aside.
Mr Maud applies to set aside the demand on two grounds. The first is under r 6.5(4)(b) because he contends that the debt has already been satisfied in full by Mr Derek Quinlan who was jointly and severally liable with Mr Maud for the original debts which were the subject of the judgment. He argues that the evidence he has put forward raises an arguable case that his liability for the original debt and hence for the judgment debt has been extinguished. Whether this is in fact what has happened is a matter which, he submits, needs to be explored at a trial and for present purposes this constitutes a substantial dispute as to whether the debt is still due. His second ground is that the statutory demand ought to be set aside because the Respondents are pursuing a collateral purpose by serving this statutory demand. That purpose is to trigger pre-emption rights set out in the articles of association of a company which is at the moment jointly owned by Mr Maud and Mr Quinlan and of which the Respondents wish to gain control. He submits that this collateral purpose means that the court should be satisfied ‘on other grounds’ that the demand should be set aside, for the purposes of r 6.5(4)(d).
This application to set aside the statutory demand was heard on the day after I heard Mr Maud’s application to set aside a statutory demand served on him in unrelated proceedings by the Libyan Investment Authority r
