Magee v Crown Prosecution Service

J U D G M E N T

LORD JUSTICE ELIAS: This is an appeal by way of case stated from the Bromley Magistrates' Court. The appellant was charged with two offences: first, failing to stop after an accident where damage was caused to another vehicle contrary to section 170(4) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 ; and second, driving whilst over the alcohol prescribed limit contrary to section 5.1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 . She pleaded not guilty to the first charge but guilty to the second.

District Judge Fanning stated the case and identified certain questions which the court is required to answer.

Before considering the background, I will set out the relevant legislation.

Section 171(b)(i) is as follows:

"(1)This section applies in a case where, owing to the presence of a mechanically propelled vehicle on a road or other public place, an accident occurs by which.

(a) [...]

(b)damage is caused —

(i)to a vehicle other than that mechanically propelled vehicle or a trailer drawn by that mechanically propelled vehicle [...]"

Sub- section 2 states:

"(2)The driver of the mechanically propelled vehicle must stop and, if required to do so by any person having reasonable grounds for so requiring, give his name and address and also the name and address of the owner and the identification marks of the vehicle.

"(3) If for any reason the driver of the mechanically propelled vehicle does not give his name and address under subsection (2) above, he must report the accident.

"(4) A person who fails to comply with subsection (2) or (3) above is guilty of an offence."

The facts as found by the District Judge were as follows. The appellant reversed her car into a vehicle belonging to Mr Assadi and damaged it. She drove off but had to give way at a give way junction. At that point she was told by Mr Assadi and his son that she had collided with Mr Assadi's car.

The appellant got out of her car but denied that she was involved in the accident. She swore at Mr Assadi and drove away. She did not give details of her name and address and did not report the accident. The appellant accepted that the car which had allegedly hit Mr Assadi's vehicle was indeed hers. She also accepted that she was the person to whom Mr Assadi had spoken.

At the relevant time she was driving while well over the prescribed alcohol limit. Her recollection and judgment were affected by the alcohol but she genuinely did not believe that there had been an accident. The judge accepted that this was h