Kingsley v Orban
2014
CHANCERY DIVISION
United Kingdom
CORAM
- MR JUSTICE NUGEE
Areas of Law
- Civil Procedure
- Contract Law
2014
CHANCERY DIVISION
United Kingdom
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
This case involves an appeal by Mr. Laurence Kingsley against a decision that awarded costs to the claimant, Judith Orban, in relation to an application to set aside a statutory demand. The main issues addressed were whether it was reasonable for Orban's solicitor, Mr. Mark Williams, to proceed with the application without written confirmation of withdrawal from Kingsley and whether costs could be awarded despite late filing of the cost schedule. Mr. Justice Nugee dismissed the appeal, upholding that the solicitor acted prudently and that the costs were appropriately awarded.
Judgment
MR JUSTICE NUGEE: I have before me an appeal from a decision of Deputy District Judge Brafield sitting in the Kingston County Court dated 9 September 2013, in which he ordered the defendant, Mr Laurence Kingsley, to pay the claimant’s costs, the claimant being Judith Orban, and assessed those costs summarily in the sum claimed by Miss Orban’s solicitor, Mr Mark Williams of W Davies in the sum of £2,208 plus VAT, making a grand total of £2,649.60.
The background to the action is that Mr Kingsley, who is a former solicitor and now carries on practice as what he calls a legal consultant, had provided legal services to Miss Orban. He claimed that money was due to him for those services and issued a statutory demand in the sum of £6,500. That was dated 18 June 2013 and the statutory demand was in respect of a bill dated 16 April 2012 for the supply of legal services from a date in July 2011 to 8 January 2012. That, as I say, was dated 18 June; it does not appear to be disputed that the last day available under the Insolvency Rules for Miss Orban to apply to set that aside was Monday 8 July 2013.
On 27 June Mr Kingsley was contacted by Mr Williams of W Davies, who indicated that he had been instructed in relation to the statutory demand, and Mr Kingsley suggested that he should put his reasons for setting aside the statutory demand in writing. That was done by Mr Williams on 1 July in a letter which said at the outset that “the sum demanded is disputed and unless you confirm in writing by 4pm 3 July 2013 it is withdrawn we shall have no option but to apply for the court to set aside the demand”; then again the end of the letter repeated “we request you formally withdraw the section 9 and confirm this in writing by 4pm 3 July, failing which our client shall have no choice but to apply to have the demand set aside”. Mr Kingsley replied to that by letter dated 2 July taking issue with the points of substance raised by Miss Williams but not at that stage saying anything about withdrawing the demand.
Mr Williams had received that letter by 3 July and at 13:27 on 3 July sent an email to Mr Kingsley saying that “we have no option but to apply to set aside as previously warned” and, at the end, “If you genuinely wished to deal with the issues raised then you should have agreed to withdraw the demand”. That seems to have prompted a telephone call on the morning of 4 July from Mr Kingsley to Mr Williams at about 10:15. There is an attendance note made by Mr K