Judgment
Sir David Eady :
The court is asked to determine the meaning(s) of the words complained of in this libel action by way of preliminary issue. It is generally thought that such hearings are likely to become more common in future, having regard to the recent removal of the (qualified) “right” to jury trial. This was brought about by the amendment to s.69(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 contained in s.11 of the Defamation Act 2013 . (See e.g. the observations of Tugendhat J in Cruddas v Calvert [2013] EWHC 1427 (QB) , at [100], and the commentary in Gatley on Libel & Slander (12 th edn) at para 30.14.) In this instance, it was Tugendhat J who made provision for the preliminary issue in an order dated 25 November 2013.
Where a judge is called upon to determine meaning, it is important that there should be clarity as to the scope of enquiry. In this case, it is accepted that I should address not only meaning but also any issues as to whether any given meaning is defamatory or not, and whether it is to be classified as fact or comment: cf. Cammish v Hughes [2012] EWCA Civ 1655 at [43]. It was agreed, however, that I should not venture into resolving what the consequences of my rulings would be for the legitimate scope of any pleaded defence, such as justification or fair comment (or honest opinion).
It has long been recognised that the principles to be applied by a judge are the same whether the task is to determine actual meaning, as here, or simply to rule that the words complained of are, or are not, capable of bearing any particular meaning: see e.g. Waterson v Lloyd [2013] EWCA Civ 136 , at [17], per Richards LJ. Those principles are to be found summarised in various cases, including e.g. Gillick v Brook Advisory Centres [2001] EWCA Civ 1263 , at [7], and Jeynes v News Magazines Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 130 at [14]. I need to bear them in mind throughout this exercise.
It will generally be helpful, when a judge is called upon to determine meaning, to read the words complained of untrammelled by any gloss put upon them by the parties, and before addressing any legal submissions, since it should be easier to approach the task as an ordinary fair-minded reader – with an open and fresh mind. Also, one has to recognise that a judge is faced with something of a dilemma when resolving issues as to meaning. It is necessary to give reasons, as in any judgment, for the conclusions arrived at. On the other hand, the assessment of meaning i
