Hegazy & Ors v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
2014
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION
United Kingdom
CORAM
- SIR DAVID EADY
Areas of Law
- Civil Procedure
- Evidence Law
- Human Rights Law
2014
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION
United Kingdom
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The case involves claims against the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and individual officers for incidents on 1 June 2007. The crux of the matter was the admissibility of similar fact evidence from previous incidents. The court emphasized that similar fact evidence must pass a two-stage test for admissibility—being relevant and logically probative, and then being contextually appropriate considering potential prejudice and complexity. The decision was guided by precedents from O’Brien v Chief Constable of South Wales Police and R v Kilbourne.
Judgment
Sir David Eady :
Introduction
These proceedings are brought by the Claimants against the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis as the Defendant, seeking relief in respect of alleged false imprisonment, assault, racial discrimination and infringements of their rights under Articles 3, 8 and 14 of the ECHR arising out of incidents occurring on 1 June 2007. The Commissioner has been represented by Mr Beggs QC and Mr Berry. Individual police officers were later joined as additional parties; namely Messrs Jones, White, Wilson and Brown. They have, therefore, been separately represented by Mr Watson QC and Mr Morley. On 12 and 13 December 2013 a number of applications came before the court which turned on the admissibility of similar fact evidence.
There were applications on behalf of the Second and Third Claimants developed by Ms Kaufmann QC and on behalf of the First Claimant argued by Mr Roche. It was accepted by the parties that I should determine their applications to admit such evidence, primarily relating to earlier incidents involving Mr Jones (in nine cases) or Mr Brown (in two cases), since other applications made on the Claimants’ behalf relating to amendments of their Particulars of Claim and/or to their entitlement to further disclosure of documents would be likely to turn in large measure upon the outcome of that primary issue. It was agreed in the course of the hearing that mode of trial should be by judge alone.
The relevant principles
There was little, if any, difference between counsel as to the modern principles relating to the admission of similar fact evidence. Argument turned largely upon how the law should be applied to the facts of the particular case. Such disputes often arise in circumstances where the court would, but for the admission of such evidence, be placed in the difficult position of resolving factual disputes on the basis of one word against the other or, perhaps, one set of assertions against another. Here, it is worth noting that not only are the individual officers separately represented but one of the police officers participating in the events of 1 June 2007 (PC Onwugbonu) is, in certain respects, intended to give evidence supporting the Claimants’ case. That is part of the unusual background against which these applications must be resolved.
It is clear from O’Brien v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2005] 2 AC 534 that any similar fact evidence that is proposed to be admitted must be addressed