Ensygnia Ltd v Rickard
2014
CHANCERY DIVISION
United Kingdom
CORAM
- MR. JUSTICE NUGEE
Areas of Law
- Corporate Law
- Civil Procedure
2014
CHANCERY DIVISION
United Kingdom
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
Ensygnia sought to restrain a winding up petition by Mr. Rickard tied to unpaid invoices for patent services. Initially, Mr. Rickard served the statutory demand believing debts were due to him, but it was revealed debts were owed to Ipulse. Subsequently, debts were assigned to Mr. Rickard, giving him standing to present the petition. The main legal question addressed was whether the debts were bona fide disputed on substantial grounds. Key principles were discussed, including the need for a creditor to present a petition and the company's ability to challenge on the grounds of a substantial dispute.
MR. JUSTICE NUGEE:
This is an application to restrain the presentation of a winding up petition. The applicant, Ensygnia, (“Ensygnia”), is a mobile interaction company whose main product is Onescan, an Omni-Channel App that enables mobile payments online, in store, and on the go, via a Smart phone with a camera. The respondent, Mr. David Rickard, is a patent attorney and a partner in a firm called Ipulse IP Partners LLP, (“Ipulse”). Ensygnia instructed Ipulse to assist with registration of patents for Onescan. They later changed their representation to Olswangs and disinstructed Ipulse. Ipulse claim that there are invoices outstanding for work carried out for Ensygnia.
The application has had a somewhat unusual procedural history. Mr. Rickard served a statutory demand for what he claimed to be the outstanding fees. The statutory demand was issued in his own name, that is as “David Rickard trading as Ipulse”, apparently in the belief that the sums payable were due to him personally. Hence, these proceedings were brought by Ensygnia against Mr. Rickard personally. In fact, it transpires that all the invoices in question, although received under the name of Ipulse, bear the statement that “Ipulse is a trading name of Ipulse IP Partners LLP.”
Although Ms. Markandya, who appears for Ensygnia, had briefly referred to these facts in her submissions, no argument was addressed to me on the consequences for this application. It was only when considering my judgment that it became apparent to me that it raised the question whether either Mr. Rickard, who had served the statutory demand but did not appear to be a creditor, or Ipulse, which claimed to be a creditor but did not appear to have served a statutory demand, was in a position to proceed with the petition. I therefore invited the parties to make further submissions on the point.
Ms. Markandya, however, did not suggest that the injunction should be granted on the simple ground that Mr. Rickard was not a creditor at all but wished me to determine the underlying question whether the debts were disputed on substantial grounds. Ms. Johnson, who appeared for Mr. Rickard, for her part accepted that at the date of the statutory demand he was not in fact a creditor, but in the short time since the point had come to her attention Ipulse had assigned all the debts in question to Mr. Rickard, and on the authority of Coulter v The Chief Constable of Dorset Police [2004] EWCA Civ 1259 she submitted that this was suffi