Dowling & Ors v Bennett Griffin
2014
COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL DIVISION)
United Kingdom
CORAM
- LORD JUSTICE RIMER
Areas of Law
- Tort Law
- Civil Procedure
2014
COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL DIVISION)
United Kingdom
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The claimants, Terence, Anne, and Anthony Dowling, filed a negligence claim against solicitors Bennett Griffin, which was dismissed in August 2013. The Dowlings accused the trial judge of bias, but these allegations lacked support. The court granted limited permission to appeal on specific grounds, focusing on the firm's failure to advise properly regarding a counterclaim and insurer notification. Permission was denied for other grounds. The court emphasized the high-risk nature of the appeal, including potential costs.
Judgment
Lord Justice Rimer :
This is a renewed application for permission to appeal. Whilst granting the applicants a short extension of time for appealing, Kitchin LJ, on the papers on 21 November 2013, refused permission to appeal for shortly expressed reasons to the effect that in his view an appeal would have no real prospect of success.
The applicants are Terence, Anne and Anthony Dowling, the claimants. The defendant/respondent is Bennett Griffin, a firm of solicitors. The applicants’ claim for damages for negligence against the firm was dismissed with costs by Mr Kevin Prosser QC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court in the Chancery Division, by an order of 20 August 2013. That order followed the judge’s reserved judgment of 12 July 2013 after a trial in March 2013.
The applicants appeared in person at the trial, their case being presented by Terence Dowling, who also presented their application to me. Having considered Mr Dowling’s representations, I have concluded that I ought to give the applicants a limited permission to appeal. I do not, however, propose to give permission by reference to any of the, with respect, somewhat ill-drawn grounds of appeal prepared by the applicants. They are mainly devoted to accusing the judge of bias in his handling of the trial, for which there is no shred of support, and Mr Dowling sensibly recognised at the hearing before me that these allegations did not merit the giving of permission to appeal and he did not attempt to persuade me otherwise. Paragraph (8) of the grounds makes a more substantive point to the effect that Mr Alan Phillips, rather than his company Alan Phillips Associated Limited (‘APAL’), was always the correct claimant in the earlier fees action and counterclaim. I do not accept that this is seriously arguable. The deputy judge was, in my view, right to find, in [17] to [19] of his judgment, that the relevant contract was with APAL, not with Mr Phillips personally, and the applicants have no real prospect on an appeal of showing that he was wrong in this respect. Nor, for the reasons given by the judge in [37] to [41], was any new, or separate, contract entered into with Mr Phillips personally when the 15% fee was later agreed.
On the other hand, I consider that the applicants have an arguable case that the firm did not advise them adequately as to the risk that APAL had not duly notified its insurers of their counterclaim in the fees action, and/or that the firm did not, i