Judgment
Lord Justice Pitchford :
Introduction
This is an appeal from the order of Lang J of 19 February 2013 ( [2013] EWHC 279 Admin) dismissing the appellant’s claim for judicial review of the refusal of the Secretary of State for the Home Department to grant British citizenship to the appellant under section 6(1) of the British Nationality Act 1981.
By letter of 4 March 2011 the Secretary of State notified the appellant of her decision that naturalisation should be refused because there were ‘serious doubts’ as to the appellant’s character which arose from his military service in Iran. It was at one time envisaged by the parties that it might be necessary for the court to examine the scope of the discretion reposed in the Secretary of State under section 6(1) and the proper approach to the exercise of judgement. There is, however, nothing of substance between the parties upon these issues and counsel have helpfully, and I think properly, refined the issue in this appeal to a single question, namely whether the Secretary of State failed or failed adequately to take into consideration a factor relevant to her statutory judgment, namely that the appellant’s military service in Iran had been conscripted and involuntary.
The statutory power
Section 6(1) of the British Nationality Act 1981 provides:
“(1) If on an application for naturalisation as a British citizen made by a person of full age and capacity, the Secretary of State is satisfied the applicant fulfils the requirements of schedule 1 for naturalisation as a citizen under this sub-section, he may, if he thinks fit, grant to him a certificate of naturalisation as such a citizen.”
For the purposes of the present appeal the relevant part of schedule 1 appears in paragraph 1(1)(b) which provides:
“ ... the requirements for naturalisation as a British citizen under section 6(1) are, in the case of any person who applies for it
…
that he is of good character.”
The parties are in agreement that the Secretary of State enjoys a significant measure of appreciation in assessing for herself the requisite standard of good character in the factual context of the application under consideration. In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department , ex parte Al Fayed [2000] EWCA Civ 523 , [2001] Imm AR 134 at paragraph 41 Nourse LJ (with whom in this respect Kennedy and Rix LJJ agreed) observed that the concept of good character was incapable of being defined against a single standard to which all co