Bar Standards Board, R (on the application of) v Disciplinary Tribunal of the Council of the Inns of Court & Anor
2014
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
UK
CORAM
- LORD JUSTICE MOSES
- MR JUSTICE COLLINS
Areas of Law
- Administrative Law
- Civil Procedure
- Costs
2014
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
UK
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The Bar Standards Board challenged a cost award for a barrister who defended herself, arguing she shouldn't get full professional costs. The court ruled CPR 48.6 didn't automatically apply and reduced her rate to £60/hour instead of £120.
Judgment
Lord Justice Moses:
The Bar Standards Board seeks judicial review of a decision of the Disciplinary Tribunal of the Council of the Inns of Courts on costs.
There was no dispute but that it was open to the Bar Standards Board to bring these proceedings by way of judicial review since no appeal lay against the decision of the Disciplinary Tribunal to the Visitors under Regulation 25 of the Disciplinary Tribunals Regulations 2009 (amended February 2012). Such an appeal lies only against conviction or sentence, and an order for costs is not a sentence under Regulation 19. (See also Mackay J in Connerty v BSB [D 2004/082] 10 July 2008.) The principle in R v Visitors to the Inns of Court ex-parte Calder [1994] QB 1 does not apply.
On 6 September 2012 disciplinary proceedings were determined in favour of the interested party, a barrister not currently in practice, and not practising at the time of the complaint against her that led to the disciplinary charges. The Tribunal ordered that the Bar Standards Board should pay for her costs and appointed an assessor to determine the amount. By a decision dated 14 February 2013 Mr Post QC ordered that the Bar Standards Board should pay costs in the sum of £27,521.50. Included within that amount was a figure for the costs of the barrister’s time, claimed at the rate of £120 per hour. It is important to emphasise that the number of hours she had spent resisting the allegations was 166 hours. The only dispute was as to rate.
It is necessary to recall the basis upon which the assessor reached a figure of £120 per hour. The starting point is Regulation 31 of the Disciplinary Tribunals Regulations 2009. By Regulation 31(1) the Disciplinary Tribunal has power to make such orders for costs either against or in favour of a defendant, as it sees fit. By Regulation 31(2) the Disciplinary Tribunal is required, either itself or through an appointee, to determine the amount of such costs. It can be seen and is agreed that the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 do not apply. Nevertheless, the assessor took the view that they were, as he put it, “persuasive” as to how he should exercise his discretion. The Bar Standards Board supports that view. But it disputes the approach the assessor adopted once he had determined that he should proceed as if the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 applied.
The assessor took the view that he was bound by Miller v Bar Standards Board , a decision of Ryder J, sitting as a Visitor, in 2012. In those p