Andrews, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Environment Food and Rural Affairs
2014
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
UK
CORAM
- MR JUSTICE FOSKETT
Areas of Law
- Administrative Law
- Property and Real Estate Law
2014
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
UK
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
In this case, the claimant aimed to modify a definitive map to include a public bridleway based on an 1801 Inclosure Award, which was initially dismissed by Wiltshire County Council and upheld by the Secretary of State. The court had to interpret the 1801 Act and previous High Court decisions regarding the appointment of public bridleways and footways and consider if the 1801 Act made the Inclosure Award binding and immune to current challenges. After thorough analysis, the court held that the 1801 Act did not confer powers to set out public bridleways and footways and that sections 35 of the 1801 Act and 25 of the Crudwell Act 1816 did not preclude current challenges to the award.
Judgment
MR JUSTICE FOSKETT:
Introduction
This case raises the question of whether the then Secretary of State, by her Inspector, was right to dismiss an appeal against the decision of Wiltshire County Council refusing an application made by the Claimant to the Council for it to modify the Definitive Map for its area to include upon it a public bridleway that does not currently appear on that map.
In order to answer that general question it is necessary –
(a) to construe the meaning of a particular section of an Act of Parliament given the Royal Assent over 200 years ago on 2 July 1801;
(b) to consider whether the decision of a High Court Judge (Schiemann J, as he then was) in May 1993, in a case brought by the same Claimant in which the Claimant conceded the interpretation point in issue in the present case –
(i) is decisive of that point in this case in the sense that part of the judge’s reasoning involved reaching a conclusion that negates the basis of the Claimant’s current argument;
(ii) if so, whether it was “plainly wrong” for him to have done so;
(iii) if the judge in fact made no decision on the point, whether, in the light of further evidence and further argument, the original concession as to the meaning of the relevant section was wrongly made;
(c) irrespective of the answers to the foregoing issues, to consider whether another section of the 1801 Act has the effect of making the “Inclosure Award” in 1841 (which purportedly created the relevant bridleway, pursuant to the local Act passed in 1816 which incorporated provisions of the 1801 Act ) “binding and conclusive” and not susceptible now to challenge.
Thus identified the issues seem ideal for a student moot and somewhat remote from the usual day to day work of the Administrative Court. However, the claim (which is brought with the support of the Ramblers Association) is a “test case” and, I am told, between 500-1000 other public rights of way across private land might be capable of being established in other parts of England and Wales if the Claimant’s argument succeeds.
Whilst the issues may seem arcane, they are important. In the first place, those seeking more widespread public access across private land will wish to see the argument succeed. Equally, however, there will be many private landowners whose land is not currently exposed to public access in this way who will be troubled by the thought that it may become thus exposed. The landowner of the farmland in Wiltshire that