WINDWORTH HOLDINGS (PTY) LTD v. DUPAUL WOOD TREATMENT (GH) LTD
January 23, 2019
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- YEBOAH, JSC (PRESIDING)
- GBADEGBE, JSC
- APPAU, JSC
- MARFUL-SAU, JSC
- KOTEY, JSC
Areas of Law
- Civil Procedure
- Evidence Law
- Contract Law
January 23, 2019
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
Gbadegbe JSC, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court panel presided over by Yeboah JSC, dismissed a further appeal from a Court of Appeal decision that affirmed a High Court’s partial summary judgment for the plaintiff on a debt claim. The defendant had earlier accepted absolute liability, proposed instalments, and made payments but later challenged the plaintiff’s capacity and raised issues about the cession of Cachecorp Pty’s books. The trial judge first determined capacity via an Order 32 directions application, then granted summary judgment for a lesser amount (exhibit “M”), which the Court of Appeal upheld. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the defendant’s admissions and conduct created a conclusive presumption and estoppel under Evidence Act sections 24 and 26, precluding contrary evidence and any triable issues. It further held that Order 14 rule 5(1)(a) authorizes judgment on part of a claim, validating the lower award. The case‑management approach was also endorsed, and the appeal was dismissed.
GBADEGBE, JSC:- We have before us an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal, which upheld the judgment of the trial High Court in favor of the plaintiff for summary judgment against the defendant on part of the claim. The defendant’s main complaint before us relates to the refusal by the trial court to grant him leave to defend the action and arising therefrom the award of a figure different from that endorsed on the writ of summons. In these proceedings, for reasons of consistency, I shall refer to the parties by the designation that they bore in the trial court. By the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the position was reiterated that the defendant’s statement of defence by which she sought to show cause against the application for summary judgment disclosed no triable issues.
Before proceeding with the appeal herein, the observation is made that it is quite plain from the record of appeal that the parties and to some extent the court exercised unusual latitude regarding the nature and scope of Order 14 applications resulting in the parties taking some steps in the proceedings, which may be described as unauthorized. A quick reference may be made to one such step namely an application filed by the defendant to dismiss the application for summary judgment. It is trite learning that at the hearing of an application for summary judgment, one of the of the orders available to the court at the hearing under the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, CI 47 of 2004 is an order of dismissal of the application and accordingly it makes no sense that a formal application was made by the respondent to the said application for an order dismissing the application. It being an application, it stood either to be granted or refused having regard to the affidavit evidence placed before the trial judge. It is unfortunate to observe that at certain times in the course of the proceedings had in the trial court, the learned trial judge lost control of the management of the case, a situation that had adverse effect on the pace of the litigation and accounts for the length of time that such a simple matter took before him.
Regarding the steps preceding the hearing of the application under Order 14, the plaintiff who had previously filed an application for summary judgment that was pending before the trial court must have been compelled by the challenge to his capacity to take out an application for directions under Order 32 as the point relating thereto cannot be conveni