TSIKATA v ATTORNEY-GENERAL
2002
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- EDWARD WIREDU CJ
- BAMFORD-ADDO
- AMPIAH
- KPEPGAH
- ADJABENG
- ACQUAH
- ATUGUBA
- AKUFFO
- ADZOE JJSC
Areas of Law
- Constitutional Law
- Civil Procedure
- Criminal Law and Procedure
- Administrative Law
2002
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
Tsatsu Tsikata challenged the constitutionality of the ‘Fast Track High Court’ and a summons commanding him to appear ‘in the President’s name.’ The Fast Track system, established by the Chief Justice through administrative guidelines and electronic case management, was described as a division of the High Court intended to expedite cases, primarily civil. The Supreme Court, exercising its exclusive original jurisdiction, examined whether article 139(3) authorized creation of such a division and whether the court had jurisdiction over criminal matters. The majority reasoned that courts must be created by law, that ‘division’ under article 139(3) refers to geographical divisions, and that only the Rules of Court Committee can make procedural rules, rendering the guidelines ineffective as a legal basis for a new court. Separately, justice must be administered in the name of the Republic, so the summons in the President’s name was unconstitutional. By a 5–4 vote, the Court declared the Fast Track High Court unconstitutional, voided the summons, and restrained prosecution in that forum.
Bamford-Addo JSC. The plaintiff has invoked the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under articles 1(2) and 130(1) of the Constitution, 1992 of Ghana, which gives the Supreme Court exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of this Constitution. Article 1 of the Constitution, 1992 provides that:
“1. (1) The Sovereignty of Ghana resides in the people of Ghana in whose name and for whose welfare the powers of government are to be exercised in the manner and within the limits laid down in this Constitution. 2. This Constitution shall be the supreme law of Ghana and any other law found to be inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.”
Article 2 of the Constitution, 1992 has provided how the supreme law is to be enforced. Accordingly, it states:
“2. (1) A person who alleges that— (a) an enactment of anything contained in or done, under the authority of that or any other enactment; or (b) any act or omission of any person; is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of a provision of this Constitution, may bring an action in the Supreme Court for a declaration to that effect.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
Our mandate here is that whenever any person alleges that any act or omission of another is inconsistent or is in contravention of any part of the Constitution, 1992 the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to interpret the particular article and if it is so found, to declare that act null and void. In this way the Constitution, 1992 is enforced.
In this case, the Attorney-General sought to try the plaintiff on a criminal charge for a criminal offence under section 179A of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29) at the so-called “Fast Track High Court” which has been set up by the Chief Justice. The plaintiff therefore issued a writ in this court, and in the writ he claims that the Fast Track High Court was an unconstitutional court with no legal mandate to try him in respect of the offence with which he had been charged. In other words, that the creation of the “Fast Track High Court” was inconsistent with the Constitution, 1992 and therefore not a court of competent jurisdiction which can try him. The defendant on his part claimed that the “Fast Track High Court” was legally and constitutionally set up and is a division of the ordinary High Court. That it was set up under article 139(3) of the Cons