REPUBLIC v. HIGH COURT, ACCRA; EXPARTE OSAFO
2011
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- DR. DATE-BAH, JSC (PRESIDING)
- OWUSU (MS), JSC
- DOTSE, JSC
- BAFFOE-BONNIE, JSC
- GBADEGBE, JSC
Areas of Law
- Civil Procedure
- Constitutional Law
2011
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The Supreme Court of Ghana, per Gbadegbe JSC, considered an application invoking its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 132 to quash a High Court, Accra ruling of 29 March 2011 that committed the applicant to twelve months’ imprisonment for contempt. Although the applicant’s motion originally sought an extension of time to apply for certiorari against three rulings, counsel abandoned that aspect and proceeded solely against the 29 March ruling. The Court focused not on the merits of the contempt but on whether the committal was made in accordance with law, given Article 14’s protection of personal liberty. The contempt was predicated on a 26 January 2009 “Judgment in Default of Defence” granting declaratory relief under Order 13 rule 6 of CI 47 without evidence or service, breaching audi alteram partem. Finding this fundamental defect rendered the underlying judgment a nullity, the Court granted certiorari and quashed the committal.
GBADEGBE, JSC:
We have before us a notice of motion at the instance of the Applicant that seeks to invoke our supervisory jurisdiction under Article 132 of the 1992 Constitution for an order of Certiorari quashing the ruling of the High Court Accra dated 29th March 2011 in Suit Number BFA.81/2007, by which the body of the Applicant was committed to prison for contempt of court. In the body of the motion paper originating the application herein, the prayer sought was for an order of extension of time within which to apply for certiorari in respect of rulings dated 29 March 201, 13 April 2011 and 21 April 2011. When the matter came up for hearing, learned counsel for the applicant’s attention having been drawn to the time frame spelt out in rule 62 of the Supreme Court Rules, CI 16 in relation to such applications, he abandoned his invitation to us that sought extension of time and proceeded with leave of the court to move the application substantively but limited only to the delivery of 29th March 2011. Following this, the parties through their counsel submitted oral arguments to us on the application that concerns the order of the High Court Accra, by which the applicant was condemned into prison for a period of twelve months.
In the course of his ruling in the matter, the learned trial judge of the High Court made a positive finding against the applicant herein as follows:
“I find the conduct of the Respondent by not complying with the 26th January order as amounting to contempt of court. I also find the conduct to be deliberate and willful for the reasons stated earlier in this Ruling and further for the fact that the application was first placed before the court on 11 August, 2009, and before me in particular on 23 November 2010.The 1st defendant/respondent since 23 November, 2010, has had a series of adjournment to his benefit to resolve the matter out of court but has failed to do so.”
Pausing here, we observe that what is before us in the application herein is unrelated to the merits of the contempt application, as the complaint on which the processes on which the matter herein are based is concerned only with inquiring into whether or not the learned trial judge of the High Court, whose pronouncement has just been referred to above, acted within jurisdiction. In the body of the motion paper, the applicant founded his challenge to the jurisdiction of the High Court on the fact that the matter was initially before a judge other than the judge who