2002
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The Supreme Court of Ghana considered a motion by Expandable Polystyrene Products Limited to quash, via certiorari under Article 132, a High Court judgment in favour of Wor. Sea. Co. (Ghana) Limited. The sole ground was that the judgment was delivered roughly two years after the close of proceedings, beyond the six-week limit in Order 63 rule 2A (as amended by L.I. 1107). The Court, led by Bamford-Addo J.S.C., held that Order 63 rule 2A must be read as a whole and in harmony with the Constitution. Article 157(3) provides that a judge remains seized until judgment and does not become functus officio prior to delivery; thus, late delivery does not void jurisdiction or the judgment. Sub-rules 4–7 of Order 63 rule 2A establish administrative responses to delay (notification to and scheduling by the Chief Justice), not nullity. The Court departed from Ex Parte Supi Mark Aaba as per incuriam. Concurring opinions by Kpegah, Adjabeng, Adzoe, and Afreh agreed in dismissing the application; Afreh offered extensive constitutional analysis. The certiorari application was dismissed.
MRS. JOYCE BAMFORD-ADDO, J.S.C.:
This is a motion invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, under Article 132 of the Constitution for the Order of Certiorari directed to the High Court Accra to quash its judgment given on 25th January 2002 in Suit No.C398/7.
The ground for this application is that:
“The judgment is null and void because at the time it was given the six week period prescribed by the rules for it to be delivered had elapsed.”
The facts are that the present applicant was Defendant in the High Court case Suit No. C898/97. The plaintiff therein instituted an action against the applicant seeking the following reliefs:—
a) The export value of sea food assessed at FF.88,318,50 or its equivalent.
b) Interest at the commercial bank lending rate calculated from the date of 1st demand until the date of payment and
c) Damages for breach of contract.
After the hearing of evidence in the case had been completed, the plaintiff filed its address on 8th December 1999 and Defendant also filed its address on 28th January 2000. The case was then adjourned for judgment by the trial High Court which was eventually delivered on the 25th January 2002 in favour of the Plaintiff for all the reliefs sought.
According to the applicant since the judgment was delivered almost 2 years after the close of the case in the High Court, instead of the stipulated 6 weeks as contained in Order 63 (2A) of L.N. 140A as amended by L.I 1107 the judgment is null and void and ought to be so declared and quashed by certiorari. The relevant rule relied on is L.I 1107 which amends Order 63 by adding rule 2A to Order 63 as contained in the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) Rules 1977 L.I 1107.
Rule 2A is contained in S.7 of L.I. 1107 and states:
“2A (1) At the close of a case before it the Court shall fix a date, which shall be not later than six weeks after the close of that case, for the delivery of judgment therein.
(2) It shall be the duty of the Court to deliver judgment as soon as possible after the close of each case before it, and in any event not later than six weeks after the close of any such case.
(3) For the purposes of this rule a case shall be deemed to be closed when the evidence has been given to the Court and the speeches subsequent thereto have been concluded.
(4) The times of the vacations in any year shall not be reckoned in the computation of the period of six weeks referred to in this rule.
(5) Where for any reason judgment ha