THE REPUBLIC v. THE CIRCUIT COURT A CAPTAIN BRIMPONG EX-PARTE RANSFORD AKWEI BULLEY
2004
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
- ESSILFIE BONDZIE, JA (PRESIDING)
- S. GBADEGBE, JA
- ANIN YEBOAH, JA
Areas of Law
- Civil Procedure
- Administrative Law
- Evidence Law
2004
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
S. Gbadegbe JA, writing for the Court of Appeal, dismissed an appeal from the High Court’s refusal of applications for certiorari and mandamus brought to challenge the Circuit Court’s denial of leave to amend pleadings. The Court stressed that in supervisory proceedings, the applicant must demonstrate on the face of the record that refusal to amend resulted in a denial of justice. It held that error of law cannot be established via affidavits or materials extraneous to the record. The appellant failed to present a proper, certified record comprising pleadings, proceedings, admitted evidence, exhibits, and the ruling; a motion (Exhibit D3) and a referenced statutory declaration were not properly exhibited or certified. Citing General Medical Council v Spackman, Republic v High Court, Sekondi Ex parte Abuna II, and Rex v Nat Bell Liquors, the Court concluded that the High Court correctly refused the prerogative reliefs, and that mandamus could not be considered without the certiorari predicate. ESSILFIE-BONDZIE JA and ANIN YEBOAH JA concurred.
GBADEGBE, JA
This is an appeal from the ruling of the High Court, Accra which refused an application for the prerogative writs of certiorari and mandamus at the instance of the appellant. In the Court below the applicant (to whom I shall in these proceedings for convenience hereinafter refer as the appellant) moved for an order of certiorari to quash the ruling of the Circuit Court refusing leave to amend his pleadings and additionally sought mandamus to compel the learned trial judge to apply the rules of Court in respect of the application for leave to amend. I must say, however, that after the appellant was granted leave under order 59 rules 2 of the applicable rules of Court to issue the application on notice he purported to seek reliefs other than those in respect of which leave was granted to him. In my view, the additional reliefs lacked legitimacy and as such I shall not refer to them in this judgment. In doing so I take refuge under Order 59 rule 5 of the rules of the High Court LN 140A.The circumstances leading to the instant proceedings before us have been fully stated in the judgment of the Court below and I shall therefore not detain the precious time of this Court regarding the examination of the facts but proceed to a consideration of the appeal.
Several grounds of appeal have been filed and argued in the statements submitted to us by learned counsel for the appellant. These grounds raise only issues of law. In my opinion, a close scrutiny of these grounds shows that they allege distinct errors of law against the decision of the Court below. As it seems to me, the question which we have to decide in these proceedings is whether the conclusion which the learned trial judge came to on the application was right? Since the pivot of the application in the Court below was error of law by the trial Circuit Court in not allowing the amendment, for certiorari to lie, it was incumbent upon the appellant to show from the "record" on which his application was based that the refusal to allow the amendment had the effect of a denial of justice. If the said situation exists then in my view the relief of mandamus which only becomes relevant after the appellant had satisfied the condition regarding certiorari may be considered. See-(1) General Medical Council v Spackman [1943] AC 627. I must at this point pause and say that the statement that I have just made should not be misconstrued to mean that in all cases where error of law is urged as a ground of