1998
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
In the Ghana Supreme Court’s Effiduase chieftaincy dispute context, Nana Adu Ameyaw II filed contempt motion SCM 70/97 against the President of the National House of Chiefs and fifteen others for alleged disrespect of court orders. The Chief Justice empaneled C. Hayfron‑Benjamin J.S.C. (presiding), Ampiah, Kpegah, Acquah and Atuguba JJ.S.C. The 16th respondent, Nana Osei Worae II, objected to Justices Hayfron‑Benjamin and Ampiah and formally moved in CM.8/98 to remove them, alleging Ampiah’s prior High Court involvement and Hayfron‑Benjamin’s prior role as his solicitor creating potential bias and misuse of confidential information. Counsel further objected to those judges sitting to decide the disqualification motion itself, invoking nemo judex in causa sua. By majority, the Court overruled the preliminary objection, holding that a formal motion does not make the judges parties and that, where facts are undisputed and only legal tests are applied, the objected judges may sit to determine the objection. Justices Kpegah and Acquah dissented, insisting that justice must be seen to be done and that the cited judges could not be judges in their own cause.
C. HAYFRON-BENJAMIN, J.S.C.:
Learned Counsel for the 16th Respondent has filed a motion before this Court seeking to have two members of this panel excuse themselves from sitting and adjudicating on a contempt of Court application presently pending before this Court. However, on the motion coming up for hearing, Learned Counsel observing that the panel of judges to hear the motion included the two members whom either Counsel or his client objected to were present on the panel, Learned Counsel peremptorily submitted
"that since the present application seeks to remove Hayfron-Benjamin and Ampiah from this panel justice would not be seen to have been done for the self same judges to sit on the application and pronouns on the propriety of their presence on the panel".
The reason assigned for such submission was that Hayfron-Benjamin, J.S.C. was the 16th Respondents lawyer (a matter on which I will reserve my comment). Counsel further contended that the objection to my sitting on this case was for "the protection of my client" Counsel referred to L.I. 613 rule 5(3). It is to be observed that in his submission, apart from the submission that the application seeks to remove Ampiah J.S.C. there was no specific charge against his Lordship.
If I understand Counsel correctly, what he seeks to do is for this panel to decide whether this panel can decide that the same panel can decide the issue of the correct composition of the panel to determine his objection. Tautological though such a rendering of the submission may be, it seems to me that Learned Counsel's invitation is for this panel to decide either that it would decline jurisdiction in the matter or that in their view the two justices to whom the objection is taken would excuse themselves to enable another panel of this Court differently composed to determine the merits of his objection.
The Supreme Court case of ATTORNEY GENERAL V. SALLAH delivered on the 17th April 1970 is often cited as authority for the proposition that when such an objection is raised the Court ought to be differently constituted for the resolution of the objection. It is however a matter for debate whether the judges to whom the objections had been taken declined to sit on the motion or whether the new panel to hear the motion was chosen by the Chief Justice in the exercise of his undoubted Constitutional powers. I would incline to the latter stand, for in the ruling of Amissah J.A. is stated thus:
"It would be wholly wrong for a par