JUDGMENT OF APALOO J.A.
The respondent was employed by the appellant corporation (hereinafter called the corporation) as a machine driver in the latter's mine at Prestea. On 30 June 1966, while engaged in his work, he was involved in an accident which resulted in the amputation of his left leg. On 13 December 1967, the respondent and the corporation entered into an agreement professedly under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1963 (Act 174), in which the latter paid to the former, the sum of N¢1,043.97 [p.361] as compensation for his injuries. On 9 January 1968, the respondent applied to the circuit court to have that agreement cancelled. This application was acceded to on 9 April of that year but the court then proceeded to make an order not entirely in harmony with the cancellation of the agreement. Barely a month after the court's order, the respondent brought an action in the High Court, Sekondi, against the corporation for damages at common law for his injuries. The action was grounded on an averment that the corporation was negligent in failing to provide a safe system of work. This was denied in the pleadings filed on behalf of the corporation. The latter also pleaded in the alternative that inasmuch as the respondent received compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, he was barred from bringing an independent action in respect of the same injuries. The respondent joined issue with the corporation on this plea.
The corporation thought that the alternative plea, if upheld, would dispose of the matter. It accordingly moved to have it decided as a preliminary issue under Order 25, rr. 2 and 3 of the Supreme [High] Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). On 7 July 1969, rival arguments were presented to Aboagye J. by counsel for the parties. On 21 July 1961 the court delivered a reasoned ruling in which it held that the respondent was not barred by section 24 (4) of the Workmen's Compensation Act from bringing the present suit. The result of the court's ruling is that the damage suit will have to be determined on its merits. The corporation say that the ruling was wrong and they seek by this appeal to have it reversed.
When the hearing of this appeal commenced before us, Mr. Mercer, counsel for the respondent, objected that the appeal was not properly before us. This is because the order appealed against was interlocutory and cannot be appealed against without special leave. For authority, he relies
