JUDGMENT OF VAN LARE J.S.C.
Van Lare J.S.C. delivered the judgment of the court. (His lordship reviewed the findings of fact made by the trial judge and continued): On the evidence as a whole the appellant does not appear to have any answer to the strong case made by the respondent nor has she put forward for consideration any case in opposition to that made by the respondent. On the other hand from the evidence of the appellant and her witnesses one is bound to be led to the conclusion that the disputed farms are not stool properties nor could they possibly be attached to the office as alleged. There is no wonder therefore in my view for the trial judge's conclusion that the disputed farms belong to the respondent's family—Kua family. This decision is in accordance with the principle of our customary law that among the Akans the immediate beneficial interest in a woman's self-acquired property descends to her children and their children—children's children meaning the children of daughters only—see the judgment of Ollennu, J. in Mills v. Addy (3 W.A.L.R. 357).
Nevertheless the appeal has been argued on certain grounds one of which [concerning the number of farms in respect of which the claim made] I have already disposed and I must now proceed to deal with the remaining ones. Notwithstanding the overwhelming strength of the respondent's case it has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the judgment in favour of the respondent is based only upon the weakness of the appellant's case. It is sufficient to say that it does not so appear to me. It has also been contended that the learned trial judge appears in his judgment to think that in a case such as this, that is to say, one eminently for a declaration of title, the onus shifted to the appellant who was the defendant in the case to establish her title. It is clear to me, however, that what the learned trial judge means by this remark is that in the absence of any probable defence to the plaintiff-respondent's case, the plaintiff-respondent must be entitled to judgment. Although agreeing that the onus never shifts in title cases, I am not in agreement with the proposition of law advanced on behalf of the appellant that a plaintiff in a suit for a declaration of title must prove his case beyond all reasonable doubt. But it must be emphasised that the respondent who was the plaintiff in the instant case has in fact done this. The principle of law which the courts in this country have always followed
