SCIPION CAPITAL (UK) v. ATUGUBA & ASSOCIATES
2021
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
- SUURBAAREH, J.A. (PRESIDING)
- MERLEY WOOD (MRS.), J.A.
- DODOO (MRS.), J.A.
Areas of Law
- Corporate Law
- Civil Procedure
- Contract Law
2021
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The Court of Appeal (per Suurbaareh, J.A.) dismissed an appeal by a corporate client challenging the High Courts refusal to strike out a suit by an incorporated law firm seeking recovery of agreed legal fees under a contract. The Appellant argued the Respondent lacked capacity because it is not on the roll of lawyers and not licensed under the Legal Profession Act 1960 (Act 32), contending only individual lawyers may sue for fees. The court held that locus standi turns on legal existence and sufficient interest, not success; an incorporated firm under the Companies Act 2019 (Act 992) is a juristic person with the right to sue and be sued for its own contracts. Act 32 governs lawyer licensing and billing but does not negate corporate capacity; section 30 recognizes bills in the partnership name. The stringent summary strike-out standard was not met. The costs award of GHS 2,000 was proper. Merley Wood, J.A., and Dodoo, J.A., concurred.
SUURBAAREH, J.A.: This is an appeal against the ruling of the High Court, General Jurisdiction, Accra, dated 16th October, 2020. The learned trial judge, in her ruling, refused an application to strike out the writ of summons and the pleadings, in the action.
Dissatisfied with the ruling, the Plaintiff/Appellant, called Appellant hereinafter, has mounted the instant appeal on the following grounds of appeal:
“a. The ruling is against the weight of the evidence on record.
b. The learned trial judge erred when she held that the Plaintiff/ Respondent, being a law firm whose name was neither entered in the roll of lawyers nor licensed to practice law, could sue for the recovery of legal fees.
c. The learned trial judge misapplied section 18(2) of the Companies Act 2019, (Act 992) and the ratio in Morkor v. Kumah [1999-2000] S.C.G.L.R. 721 when she clothed the Plaintiff/Respondent with capacity to sue for the recovery of legal fees contrary to the provisions of Section 2 of the Legal Professions Act, 1960 (Act 32). The application has occasioned the Defendant/Appellant a substantial miscarriage of justice.
d. The cost awarded for the refusal of the application is excessive.”
The Plaintiff/Respondent, simply called the Respondent, initially issued out a writ against the Appellant herein and one other for the recovery of a specific sum, being cost of legal services rendered, amongst other reliefs. Following an order striking out the other defendant, the Respondent, per its amended writ of summons and statement of claim, sought to claim the said amount, and other reliefs from the Appellant, as fees for legal services rendered upon an agreement between the parties.
The Appellant, who entered appearance to the amended writ and statement of claim on 25/7/19, subsequently filed a motion on notice on 22nd May, 2020, seeking to strike out the writ of summons and statement of claim. The Appellant, per paragraphs 6 to 9 of its affidavit in support of the motion deposed as follows:
“6. A careful look at the writ of summons clearly shows that the writ was issued by Harold Tivah Atuguba Esq. on behalf of the Plaintiff.
7. I am advised and verily believe same to be true that, by the laws of Ghana, it is only a person whose name is on the Roll of Lawyers, who is competent to commence and maintain an action for the recovery of his/her legal fees.
8. The said Harold Tivah Atuguba was never contracted by the Defendant to act in the manner which gave rise to this act