SAMUEL ADU v. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE (IGP) & ANOTHER
2018
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
- C.J. HONYENUGA (J.A) PRESIDING
- AVRIL LOVELACE-JOHNSON (J.A)
- GBIEL SUURBAAREH (J.A
Areas of Law
- Employment Law
- Civil Procedure
- Contract Law
2018
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
Avril Lovelace-Johnson, J.A., writing for the Court of Appeal, upheld a preliminary dismissal of an employment suit brought by a former Ghana Police Service officer challenging his dismissal and seeking reinstatement, salaries, and damages. The Defendants asserted that the action was statute-barred under section 4(1) of the Limitation Act, 1972 (Act 54), and the trial judge agreed, finding no reasonable cause of action. On appeal, the Plaintiff argued that internal grievance and appeal processes within the Police service meant time could not have been reasonably running and that his right to appeal was infringed, including concerns about the Central Disciplinary Board. The Defendants responded that the dismissal letter of 9 October 2008 informed him of a six-week window to appeal to the Inspector General of Police, and there was no evidence of timely delivery. The Court held that the cause of action accrued on dismissal and internal processes do not suspend limitation, rejecting any extension under Part Two of the Act and dismissing the appeal.
AVRIL LOVELACE-JOHNSON (J.A):
The Plaintiff/Appellant issued the present writ against the Defendant/Respondent for the following reliefs:
a. Declaration that any purported termination of his appointment or dismissal from the Ghana Police Service was harsh and wrongful
b. An order for the reinstatement of the Plaintiff into the Ghana Police Service forthwith.
c. An order for the payment of Plaintiff’s salaries till date of judgment.
d. An order for the payment of Plaintiff’s salaries from February 2008 to October 2008 before his dismissal.
e. Damages for wrongful termination of Plaintiff’s employment.
f. Any other reliefs or orders as the Court deems appropriate.
The Defendants/Respondents denied his claim and put up a defence including one that the Plaintiff’s action was caught by section 4(1) of the Limitation Act 1972, Act 54 and so did not disclose a reasonable cause of action.
This was set down as one of the issues to be determined at the Application for directions and the learned trial judge, rightly decided to determine it in the preliminary. She came to the conclusion that the action was indeed statute barred and so there was no need to determine the merits of the Plaintiff/Appellant’s claim and dismissed same as not disclosing any reasonable cause of action.
Being dissatisfied with this outcome, the Plaintiff Appellant has launched the present appeal. The designation of the parties at the trial court will be maintained hereon.
The Plaintiff filed three grounds of appeal with an intimation that further grounds may be filed upon receipt of the Record of Proceedings. No such additional grounds were filed and the Plaintiff abandoned his first ground of appeal. For the purposes of this appeal the following grounds were argued
ii. The learned judge erred in law by dismissing the suit on
grounds that same was statute barred by the law of
limitation
iii. The learned judge failed to appreciate that the Appellant’s
right to appeal was infringed upon by the 1st Defendant.
Both counsel argued the two grounds together. In sum the argument of counsel for the Plaintiff appears to be that at the time the Plaintiff was served with his dismissal letter, his appeal processes within the internal grievance mechanism of the 1st Defendant had not and have still not been concluded so “….time could not have been reasonably running….”.
Further counsel contends that Plaintiff’s Employer’s Central Disciplinary Board’s act of imposing a sentence on him in a c