SAMUEL ADU v. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE (IGP) & ANOTHER
2018
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
- C.J. HONYENUGA (J.A) PRESIDING
- AVRIL LOVELACE-JOHNSON (J.A)
- GBIEL SUURBAAREH (J.A
Areas of Law
- Employment Law
- Civil Procedure
2018
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The Plaintiff/Appellant's claim against the Ghana Police Service for wrongful termination was dismissed by the trial court on the grounds that it was statute-barred under the Limitation Act 1972. The Plaintiff's appeal argued that the limitations period should not have begun until the internal appeal process was concluded and that his right to appeal had been infringed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the statute of limitations began with the dismissal letter and that there were no legal grounds for extending the statutory period. The appeal was dismissed, with all concurring judges agreeing with the decision.
AVRIL LOVELACE-JOHNSON (J.A):
The Plaintiff/Appellant issued the present writ against the Defendant/Respondent for the following reliefs:
a. Declaration that any purported termination of his appointment or dismissal from the Ghana Police Service was harsh and wrongful
b. An order for the reinstatement of the Plaintiff into the Ghana Police Service forthwith.
c. An order for the payment of Plaintiff’s salaries till date of judgment.
d. An order for the payment of Plaintiff’s salaries from February 2008 to October 2008 before his dismissal.
e. Damages for wrongful termination of Plaintiff’s employment.
f. Any other reliefs or orders as the Court deems appropriate.
The Defendants/Respondents denied his claim and put up a defence including one that the Plaintiff’s action was caught by section 4(1) of the Limitation Act 1972, Act 54 and so did not disclose a reasonable cause of action.
This was set down as one of the issues to be determined at the Application for directions and the learned trial judge, rightly decided to determine it in the preliminary. She came to the conclusion that the action was indeed statute barred and so there was no need to determine the merits of the Plaintiff/Appellant’s claim and dismissed same as not disclosing any reasonable cause of action.
Being dissatisfied with this outcome, the Plaintiff Appellant has launched the present appeal. The designation of the parties at the trial court will be maintained hereon.
The Plaintiff filed three grounds of appeal with an intimation that further grounds may be filed upon receipt of the Record of Proceedings. No such additional grounds were filed and the Plaintiff abandoned his first ground of appeal. For the purposes of this appeal the following grounds were argued
ii. The learned judge erred in law by dismissing the suit on
grounds that same was statute barred by the law of
limitation
iii. The learned judge failed to appreciate that the Appellant’s
right to appeal was infringed upon by the 1st Defendant.
Both counsel argued the two grounds together. In sum the argument of counsel for the Plaintiff appears to be that at the time the Plaintiff was served with his dismissal letter, his appeal processes within the internal grievance mechanism of the 1st Defendant had not and have still not been concluded so “….time could not have been reasonably running….”.
Further counsel contends that Plaintiff’s Employer’s Central Disciplinary Board’s act of imposing a sentence on him in a c