SALLAH v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL
1970
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- Apaloo
- Siriboe
- Sowah
- Anin
- Archer JJ.A
Areas of Law
- Constitutional Law
- Administrative Law
1970
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The case involved the plaintiff seeking constitutional interpretation of provisions that allegedly terminated his employment, with the main question being whether the Government of Ghana could be properly sued. The court examined various constitutional articles and statutory provisions, particularly focusing on the interpretation of 'establish' within section 9(1) of the Proclamation. The court ruled that the Government could be sued for the complained action since it was not constitutionally immune, and that statutes must be interpreted in a manner consistent with other constitutional provisions. There was a dissenting opinion by Siriboe J. yet to be fully articulated.
EXTRACTS FROM JUDGMENT:
Per Apaloo J.A: “That the plaintiff is entitled to invoke article 106 of the Constitution and seek an interpretation of the provisions which were alleged to put an end to his employment is not in dispute. The real problem is: Against whom will such action lie? Article 36(6) disables the plaintiff from proceeding against the entity which ex facie, committed the act of which he complains. Is there any entity against which he can lawfully proceed? To answer this question, one has to look at some of the provisions of article 37 and determine the meaning of the word ‘Government’ as used in the Constitution… Article 172 says: ‘Government means any authority by which the executive authority of Ghana is duly exercised.’ It follows from this that unless that executive authority christened ‘Government,’ is constitutionally immune from legal proceedings, it must answer for the act complained of in court. Is the Government like the President, immune from legal proceedings? That question is answered in language that admits of no ambiguity by article 170(1) of the Constitution… I think the Government has been properly sued for the act complained of…
…we are entitled to assume that the draftsman of section 9(1) is fully conversant with the judicial principles of statutory interpretation. That being so, the question is: What is the meaning of the word ‘establish’ in the context of section 9(1)? Article 172 does not define it and our natural recourse must be to the dictionary. The Concise Oxford Dictionary gives it the following meaning: (a) Set up on permanent basis; (b) Settle (person or oneself in office); (c) Secure permanent acceptance for; (d) place beyond dispute. It seems that in the context of section 9(1), ‘establish’ means to set up or create.
Accordingly, it seems that any person who held or was acting in any office set up either by the Proclamation or a Decree of the National Liberation Council or under the authority of that Council fell fairly and squarely within the ambit of section 9(1). …The post to which the plaintiff was appointed was created by executive instrument in November 1961 by the President and such post was continued in the subsequent instrument of 1965. It would seem, prima facie, and on a natural construction of the words, that the plaintiff fell outside the purview of section 9(1)
…As there is a difference of opinion in this court on the correct interpretation of section 9(1), I think I ought to examine briefly th