SALLAH v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL

A former managerial officer of the Ghana National Trading Corporation (G.N.T.C.) sought constitutional interpretation under article 106 after receiving a termination letter issued at the direction of the Presidential Commission, contending that section 9(1) of the Transitional Provisions did not end his employment. Because article 36(6) insulated the President from suit, he sued the Government of Ghana, which article 172 defines as the executive authority; article 170(1) confirmed that the Government is amenable to proceedings. Writing for the majority, Apaloo J.A. held the Government was properly sued and construed ‘establish’ in section 9(1) by its ordinary meaning. Archer J.A. concurred, rejecting Kelsen’s Grundnorm and emphasizing constitutional text, while Sowah J.A. stressed governmental accountability. The majority concluded the plaintiff’s office, created under the 1960 constitutional regime, fell outside section 9(1), and rejected the notion that the Constitution itself dismissed all public servants. Anin J.A. dissented, reading article 176 to validate a broad six‑month termination power, and Siriboe J.A. also dissented.