ROYAL INVESTMENT COMPANY v. MADAM RUTH QUARCOOPOME & ORS
2021
CORAM
- APPAU, JSC (PRESIDING)
- PWAMANG, JSC
- AMEGATCHER, JSC
- TORKORNOO (MRS.), JSC
- KULENDI, JSC
Areas of Law
- Property and Real Estate Law
- Contract Law
- Civil Procedure
- Equity and Trusts
2021
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
Justice N. A. Amegatcher, writing for a unanimous five‑member Supreme Court (Appau JSC presiding, Pwamang JSC, Torkornoo JSC, and Kulendi JSC concurring), addressed whether Ghana’s statutory and equitable relief against forfeiture under the Conveyancing Act 1973 (NRCD 175) can salvage a lease that expired by effluxion of time when an option to renew was not exercised. The matter concerned a 40‑year lease granted in 1976 over land at H/No. 37/1, Borwah House, Kwame Nkrumah Avenue, Adabraka, Accra. The term ran from 1 January 1977 to 31 December 2016, with clause 4(c) requiring three months’ written notice to renew. After assignment from Adel Dakmak to the respondent in 1980, the respondent failed to give timely notice, later citing new management and difficulty locating the lessors. The Court of Appeal struck out the suit but reasoned that sections 29–30 required the lessors to notify and allow remedy. The Supreme Court held those provisions protect subsisting leases, not expired terms, and an option to renew is merely an offer. Equity’s relief was unavailable, and statutory tenancy under the Rent Act did not apply; the appeal was allowed.
AMEGATCHER JSC:-
It is rare for a party who has had his appeal to an appellate court allowed to further appeal against the judgment in its favour to a second appellate court. But, this is what has happened in the current appeal before us. According to the appellants in paragraph 3 of their affidavit in support of an application for extension of time to file an appeal and later in their statement of case, though they were satisfied with the holding and final outcome of the appeal in the Court of Appeal, the legal reasoning behind the decision opened another door for the respondent to pursue a third leg of that litigation by the filing of another writ of summons and an injunction against them, thus allowing the litigation over the property to persist. We do not think the appellants can be faulted for this course of action. For when the legal reasoning behind a decision of court is faulty and will not end the litigation, it is within the right of any of the parties to challenge that part of the decision within the hierarchy of the courts. The rules also provide for this in the notice of appeal where a party can appeal against any part of the decision of the court he is dissatisfied with.
Against this backdrop, the defendants/applicants/appellants/appellants (hereafter referred to as the appellants) has filed this appeal to this court against thereasoning behind part of the decision of the Court of Appeal dated 25 June 2019 allowing an appeal against the High Court’s ruling which dismissed the appellants’ motionto strike out the plaintiff/respondent/respondent/respondent’s (hereafter referred to as the respondent) statement of claim for not disclosing a reasonable cause of action and to dismiss the suit.
BACKGROUND
By a lease dated 31 January 1976, the appellants granted a fortyyear term commencing from 1 January 1977 to one Adel Dakmak. Under the lease, the lessee had to demolish the existing buildings and erect a modern building on the land. After erecting the building, Adel Dakmak on 18 September 1980 assigned the residue of the term to the respondent. The respondent as the assignee therefore became bound by the terms and conditions of the said lease.
By clause 4 (c) of the lease, if the lessee was desirous of taking a new lease at the expiration of the forty years, it had to notify the lessor in writing not less than three months before the expiration of the term. The respondent failed to notify the appellants of its intention to exercise the option t