REPUBLIC v. SECRETARY TO THE CABINET; EX PARTE GA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL
1970
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- ABBAN J
Areas of Law
- Administrative Law
- Civil Procedure
- Constitutional Law
1970
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The Ga Traditional Council sought an order of certiorari to quash a notice published by the Secretary to the Cabinet, which announced changes in the status of chiefs in the Awutu Traditional Area, arguing it was made without jurisdiction. Preliminary objections were made claiming the application was time-barred under the Public Officers Act, 1962, and that the applicants lacked locus standi. The court held that certiorari proceedings fall within the definition of 'action' under section 7 of Act 114, thus requiring the application to be filed within three months. The court also held that the applicants were not an aggrieved party, as the notice did not usurp their functions.
JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.
This application was brought by the Ga Traditional Council for an order of certiorari to quash a notice published at page 75 of the Local Government Bulletin, No. 14, signed by the respondent and dated 20 March 1970. The publication informed the general public that changes in the status of certain chiefs in Awutu Traditional Area had been brought to the notice of the government. The title and the first part of the publication read as follows:
"CHANGES AFFECTING THE STATUS OF A CHIEF
The public are hereby informed that the following changes in the status of the Chiefs mentioned in the Schedule hereto have been notified to the Government:-"
[p.73]
Under the schedule it is stated that Nai Whetey Ndamkwei IV the Awutu Odefey in the Awutu Traditional Area was destooled on 31 December 1969, and in his place one George Kwame Osadu had been enstooled under the stool name of Nai Whetey Agyeman Larbi II.
The applicants' main objection and their basis for asking for this order of certiorari is that the respondent, who is the Secretary to the Cabinet, made this publication without jurisdiction and without lawful authority. In pursuance of the applicants' ex parte motion granted on 12 October 1970, the respondent was served with notice of the motion. On the return date, and before the motion was heard on its merits, learned counsel for the respondent raised certain preliminary legal objections. The first objection was that the respondent being a public officer, the application for certiorari against him should have been brought within three months after 20 March 1970, the date on which the alleged cause of action was supposed to have accrued. Counsel argued that Order 59, r. 3 of the Supreme [High] Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), provides that the application for certiorari should be made within six months or such shorter period as prescribed by any enactment. Learned counsel therefore contended that in the present application the Public Officers Act, 1962 (Act 114), has provided a shorter period of three months so far as the respondent is concerned. Consequently, the applicants ought to have brought their ex parte application for leave on or before 20 June 1970; but they did not do so and they were out of time by about five weeks at the time the said ex parte application was filed. That being the case, counsel for the respondent argued that the applicants should have applied for an enlargement of time; and since no order