REPUBLIC v. GENERAL LEGAL COUNCIL DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE; EX PARTE ABOAGYE-DA COSTA
1989
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
- TAYLOR J.S.C.
- OSEI-HWERE
- AMPIAH JJ.A
Areas of Law
- Administrative Law
- Civil Procedure
- Evidence Law
1989
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The court, per Taylor J.S.C., considered A. A. Aboagye-da Costa’s motion to stay a twelve-month suspension imposed by the General Legal Council’s disciplinary committee for alleged professional misconduct concerning his dealings with client Nana Bosompem Awuah and his representation of accused Kwabena Okyere. The court noted the applicant’s appeal filed to the Court of Appeal and the absence of the record of proceedings despite his request. It analogized the stay application to bail pending appeal, applying established principles mutatis mutandis. Focusing on the balance of justice and the irreversibility of a suspension served before appellate review, and mindful of imminent legal vacation and delays in preparing the record, the court ordered a stay of the suspension pending the appeal and granted the motion.
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.S.C.
This is a motion for a stay of execution of the order made by the disciplinary committee of the General Legal Council against Mr. A. A. Aboagye-da Costa. By that order he was suspended for twelve months as a legal practitioner in our courts. It was in connection with a charge of professional misconduct under section 9 (7) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct and Etiquette) Rules, 1969 (L.I. 613) which he faced on 11 May 1989, the date of the order.
We heard argument this morning but because of the impending legal vacation we adjourned for two hours to consider the application, which we now proceed to dispose of. The gravamen of the charge contained in the particulars is stated as follows:
"Alex Aboagye-da Costa (lawyer) between April 1986 and 1987 at Asamankese in the Eastern Region in his dealings with his client, Nana Bosompem Awuah, did not behave with utmost honesty and frankness."
This is a charge of misconduct against a professional man, and the practice in our courts is that the burden is on those making the accusation to establish the charge.
This manner of considering cases of misconduct is in consonance with section 15 (1) of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D. 323). To find out therefore if those with the legal obligation of making out the charge have indeed done so, it is necessary to have a look at the proceedings; but unfortunately in his affidavit in support of his application, the applicant has deposed that he applied for a copy of the record of proceedings and as of now he has not been supplied with the said record. We are consequently in no position to decide whether those in charge of the inquiry did, in accordance with law, fulfil their statutory obligation. And we are not unmindful of the fact that those in charge of the inquiry have the responsibility to supply the record of proceedings.
The application for the suspension or stay of execution of the disciplinary sanction imposed in this case by the disciplinary committee is not unlike an application for bail pending appeal in criminal cases since it is a disciplinary punitive measure taken against a person on a charge of wrongdoing. We think the principles that our courts have built up over the years in applications for bail can mutatis mutandis be applied in such a case. It will be recalled that in State v. Halm, Court of Appeal, 27 July 1967, unreported, Akufo-Addo C.J. said:
[p.107]
"The grant of bail to a convicted prisoner pending the