REPUBLIC v. CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE, ACCRA; EX PARTE SAKARA

JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.S.C.

In Republic v. Circuit Court, Accra; Ex parte Tay, High Court, Accra, 23 August 1989, unreported, the applicant therein invited the High Court presided over by Ammah J. to quash a ruling of her Honour Beatrice Agyeman-Bempah, Circuit Court judge, that she had no jurisdiction to entertain landlord and tenant suits where the recoverable rent was under ¢1,000 per month. The application failed, and Ammah J. confirmed the decision of the judge that the body vested with jurisdiction was the rent and housing committee set up as part of the public tribunal system by the Rent Control Law, 1986 (P.N.D.C.L. 138) as amended by the Rent Control (Amendment) Law, 1986 (P.N.D.C.L. 163). When therefore the present applicant issued his writ claiming rent at the rate of ¢400 per month and asking for recovery of possession and the matter came before her, the learned circuit court judge had no doubt in her mind that she could not entertain the suit. Although it was undefended she declined to enter judgment for the plaintiff. Instead, she called upon counsel to satisfy her as to her powers and, having heard him, proceeded to rule that she had no jurisdiction to grant the reliefs. The question is whether she was right.

The jurisdiction of the circuit court to entertain landlord and tenant suits will be found in section 32 (1) (a) (ii) and (iii) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372) as amended by the Courts (Amendment) Law, 1987 (P.N.D.C.L. 191) which reads as follows:

"32. (1) The jurisdiction of a Circuit Court shall consist of the following:

(a) an original jurisdiction in civil matters . . .

(ii) in all actions between landlord and tenant for the possession of land claimed under lease and refused to be delivered up;

(iii) in all causes and matters involving the ownership, possession, occupation of or title to land."

[p.382]

It will be observed that nothing is said about the recoverable rent, so that there is jurisdiction even if the rent per month is as low as ¢400.

The reason given by the learned judge for declining to deal with the merits of the matter before her was that the jurisdiction of the court was ousted by section 2 (e) of P.N.D.C.L. 138. But all that the provision did was to make section 1 which deals with the regulation of rents inapplicable to leases and tenancies where the rent payable exceeds ¢1,000 per month. The section which has a bearing on jurisdiction is section 6 which, while declaring that until 6 March 1987 no appl