PROMEXPORT INTERNATIONAL (GHANA) LTD. v. FIRST GHANA BUILDING SOCIETY
1989
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
- OSEI-HWERE
- AMPIAH
- LAMPTEY JJ.A
Areas of Law
- Civil Procedure
- Property and Real Estate Law
- Contract Law
- Corporate Law
1989
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
First Ghana Building Society, having acquired house No. D. 653/4 on Kojo Thompson Road, Accra, sued tenant Promexport International (Ghana) Ltd for possession of the first floor and mesne profits, alleging Promexport refused to attorn and pay rent since August 1980. The High Court granted the Societys motion to strike Promexports eighteen-paragraph defence for disclosing no reasonable answer and entered judgment for the reliefs endorsed on the writ. On appeal, Promexport argued serious factual and legal issues existed, including assertions of an equitable interest grounded in an agreement between Kuottam Enterprises Ltd and Raymond Okudjeto. The Court of Appeal held the defence deficient: it failed to plead Okudjetos capacity to bind the company, any written, stamped, and registered instrument evidencing an equitable interest or option, and did not bring the case within Harlley v. Ejura Farms privity exceptions. The Court affirmed the High Court and dismissed the appeal.
Before the High Court, Accra, the First Ghana Building Society issued a writ of summons against the defendants, Promexport International (Ghana) Ltd, and claimed the following reliefs:
"(i) An order for recovery of possession of the first floor of house No. D. 653/4, Kojo Thompson Road, Accra occupied by the defendants.
(ii) Mesne profits from August 1980 to the date of judgment.
(iii) Such further order or orders as to the court might seem just."
The plaintiff company claimed ownership of the said property in which the defendant company is a tenant. The action was mounted against the defendant company because according to the plaintiff company, from the date that it purchased the premises the defendant company had not paid any rents and indeed refuses to pay any rents to it as the new landlord. The defendant company refused to and continues to refuse to attorn tenant to the plaintiff company. The defendant company resisted the claim of the plaintiff company and filed an eighteen-paragraph statement of defence. Counsel for the plaintiff company moved the lower court to strike out the whole of the statement of defence filed for and on behalf of the defendant company. As was to be expected the defendant company fiercely opposed the application to strike out its entire defence. The lower court heard each counsel on the application to strike out the statement of defence. In a ruling dated 28 February 1986, the trial judge stated as follows:
"The position now is that the defendant having been given the opportunity of attorning tenant refused to do so. They have remained in occupation of the premises since August 1980 without acknowledging the title of the plaintiffs or paying rent. I agree with Mr. da Rocha that the defence as it stands does not disclose any reasonable answer to the claim. It is struck out and judgment entered for the plaintiffs for the reliefs indorsed on the writ."
The defendant company is aggrieved by the above ruling and appeal to this court. The gravamen of the complaint made by learned counsel for the appellants was that on the pleadings, serious issues both of law and of fact were raised. Counsel contended that in those circumstances the case must be heard on the merits. He submitted that it was therefore wrong in law for the trial judge to summarily dismiss the defence put forward and enter judgment for the plaintiff company on its claim.
[p.398]
In reply, counsel for the plaintiff company contended that the statement of defen