PANBROS SALT INDUSTRIES LIMITED v. EMPIRE CEMENT & ANOTHER
2022
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
- HENRY KWOFIE (PRESIDING) JA
- P. BRIGHT MENSAH JA
- RICHARD ADJEI-FRIMPONG JA
Areas of Law
- Civil Procedure
- Property and Real Estate Law
2022
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The Ghana Court of Appeal, per Justice Richard Adjei‑Frimpong JA with Kwofie JA and P. Bright Mensah JA concurring, reviewed a High Court order that granted the defendants leave to amend their defence by withdrawing prior admissions. The underlying dispute involves Panbros Salt Industries Limited’s extensive leasehold at McCarthy Hill, Accra, obtained from the James Town Stool, including a later 99‑year lease and a surrender of 5.06 acres subsequently granted to the 2nd defendant with Panbros’s consent. The defendants had initially admitted Panbros’s root‑of‑title facts (paras. 1–10) but, after changing counsel, sought to retract those admissions and add a counterclaim. Applying appellate deference to discretion and established amendment principles (Order 16 rule 5 C.I. 47 and common law authorities), the Court held that withdrawal of admissions is permissible only if in good faith and without injustice. Finding the proposed withdrawal an afterthought that would prejudice Panbros and overreach, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the amendment order.
RICHARD ADJEI-FRIMPONG JA;
The issue comprised in this appeal turns on a simple procedural point. How does a trial court exercise its discretion to grant leave to amend pleadings when the amendment sought, entails a withdrawal of a fact admitted in the earlier?
The decision, whether or not to grant such leave being purely discretionary, and whereas in the instant case, the trial court in the exercise of the discretion granted the defendants/respondents (respondents) leave to amend, our task here as an appellate court, is to determine whether we have any business interfering with the exercise of the trial court’s discretion.
It remains a well-settled principle that an appellate court should be slow to interfere with the exercise of a trial court’s discretion. An appellate court is not at liberty merely to substitute its own discretion for that of the trial court. The reason is that the discretion belongs to the trial court. Therefore, the appellate court ought not to reverse a discretionary decision of a trial court merely because it would have exercised the discretion differently were the power vested in it. It would only interfere with the exercise of discretion of a trial court where the latter applied wrong principles, or the conclusion reached would work manifest injustice or that the discretion was exercised on wrong or inadequate material. A considerable body of case law for these principles would include CRENSTIL VRS CRENSTIL (1962)1 GLR 271; TRABOULSE & CO VRS PATERSON ZONCHONIS & CO (1973)1 GLR 133; BUABENG VRS FORKUO, 2ND JANUARY, 1970, digested in (1970) C.C 59 (CA); IN RE PARAMOUNT STOOL OF BAMIANKOR; EFFIA IV & ANOR VRS NANA TAIBA II & ORS (2010) SCGLR 37.
The facts leading to the decision on appeal are devoid of any complexity. The parties are before the trial court disputing over a parcel of land situate at McCarthy Hill, Ga South, Accra. The plaintiff/appellant (appellant) has sought the usual reliefs of declaration of title, recovery of possession, damages for trespass and injunction.
In the statement of claim attached to the writ, certain facts which, as would be discovered, border on the acquisition of the land, were pleaded in paragraphs 1 to 10 thereof. By their statement of defence filed by their former lawyer, the respondents by paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof made an unequivocal admission of appellant’s said pleadings.
Subsequently, the respondents changed their lawyer who applied for leave to amend the statement of defence. The pr