On 20 January, 1968 the plaintiff as head of family of one Mamiru (deceased) sued the defendants claiming by his writ of summons a declaration of title to and possession of a house and an order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his ownership and possession of the said house. Pleadings were duly delivered, and on 18 April 1968 the plaintiff by his solicitor took out a summons for directions under the Supreme [High] Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), Order 30, returnable on 29 April 1968. On 29 April 1968 the summons for directions came before Francois J. who made an order that the case should proceed to trial on the agreed issues and ordered the registrar to fix a date.
It appears that the registrar did not fix a date and no further steps were taken in this action until 5 May 1971 when the solicitor of the plaintiff by a letter to the registrar requested the suit to be listed for hearing on a date in June. This was acceded to and the registrar fixed 15 June 1971 as the hearing date and on 20 May 1971 the solicitor for the defendants was served to appear on the said 15 June 1971 for the hearing.
On 15 June 1971 Owusu Yaw appeared for the plaintiff and Abeyie holding brief for Asumadu-Sakyi appeared for the defendants. Having regard to the provisions of Order 64, r. 12 of the Supreme [High] Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), I took the view that the case was not properly before me. I drew counsel’s attention to the said rule and invited arguments. Counsel for the plaintiff has submitted very vigorously that Order 64, r. 12 does not apply because writing to the registrar, as they did, does not amount to a “proceeding.” Counsel submitted further that after summons for directions a case is ripe for hearing and there is no other proceeding to be taken apart from fixing a date for hearing. He submitted that proceeding is a step in connection with the case which one party or the other may take but that in this particular case he has taken no steps and there is no step to be taken by the parties as the matter of fixing a date has been left by the court to the arbitrary discretion of the registrar who is not a party to the suit. Therefore this case is not covered by the rule.
I must say that these apparently plausible arguments are at first blush attractive and superficially ingenious but on careful examination they appear to be misconceived. Nevertheless, they do raise the issue as to the mean
