OMAN GHANA TRUST HOLDINGS LTD. v. ACQUAH
December 21, 1984
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
- APALOO C.J.
- FRANCOIS
- ABBAN JJ.A
Areas of Law
- Civil Procedure
- Property and Real Estate Law
December 21, 1984
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The Ghana Court of Appeal, constituted by Apaloo C.J., Francois and Abban JJ.A, had earlier on 27 November 1984 allowed an appeal from the High Court, recognizing the respondent’s right to recover possession of House No. 45 at MacCarthy Hill after five years of dispossession. The respondent entered the premises on 29 November without sheriff assistance. The applicants sought a stay of execution and an extension of time pending a Supreme Court appeal, advancing arguments that, as statutory tenants, they required a notice to quit and that regulation 18 of the Rent Regulations (L.I. 369) necessitated notifying the rent officer. They also argued for an automatic seven-day stay under Court of Appeal Rules and claimed self-help entry was unlawful. Applying Supreme Court Rule 20(1), and referencing execution principles and Order 44 rule 1 of Cap 4, the Court rejected these contentions and dismissed the motion, awarding costs to the respondent.
On 27 November 1984 we allowed an appeal from the judgment of the High Court which denied the respondent's claim for recovery of possession of house No 45, MacCarthy Hill. We considered that the respondent was entitled to possession and we felt the hardship and inconvenience he suffered by being kept out of possession for five years, was so grave that we declared him entitled to repossession of the premises on the day we pronounced judgment.
He did not, in fact, regain possession on that day. He did so two days later that is on 29 November. He was apparently able to do so without the aid of the sheriff. As at yesterday when we heard this motion, he was still in possession.
The applicants invite us to stay execution and grant them extension of time. In the context of this case, the extension can only mean reversing ourselves on our order for immediate possession and throwing the respondent out of his own premises. On any view of this matter, that will be a bold request.
The reason advanced for the application was that the applicants have appealed against our judgment and are of the view that "the appeal to the Supreme Court will succeed, in that the Supreme Court will not allow reversal of findings of fact by the trial court."
We have looked at the grounds of appeal. While not claiming infallibility for our judgment, the grounds of appeal strike us as insubstantial. We are unconvinced that the applicants have a serious question for submission to the highest appellate court of the land and on that ground, we would feel disposed to reject the application.
[p.201]
Although the grounds filed show that the applicants proposed to contest the judgment of the court on purely factual grounds, some argument was addressed to us which would make it appear that some arguable points of law were going to be raised.
It was urged, for instance, that as the applicants were statutory tenants, the respondent incurred an obligation to give them notice to quit before seeking a possession order against them. It was also said he did not comply with regulation 18 of the Rent Regulations, 1964 (L.I. 369). That regulation obliged the respondent to notify the rent officer of his intention to apply for possession. It was said as these statutory regulations were not obeyed, the order granting possession to the respondent was incompetent.
Although these contentions were proffered as questions of law, they are in truth, factual ones. Whether the respondent gave the applicants no