JUDGMENT OF MENSA-BOISON J.
The defendant judgment-debtor by counsel moves the court for stay of execution of a judgment debt of ¢20,610 and for a payer to pay by proposed monthly instalments after the issue [p.88] of a writ of fieri-facias by the judgment-creditor. Although it is conceded that there is power for the court to stay execution by virtue of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), Order 42, r. 16 (1) (b), it is contended that the rule does not enable the High Court to grant the applicant the further relief of an order for payment of the judgment debt by instalments. Order 42, r. 16 (1) (b) provides, "The Court or a Judge may, at or after the time of giving judgment or making an order, stay execution until such times as they or he shall think fit." Mr. Lokko arguing for the contention relies on Amo-Mensah v. Owusu [1972] 1 G.L.R. 250 where Taylor J. sitting at the Kumasi High Court declined jurisdiction to make an order for payment by instalment upon a stay of execution, on the ground that Order 42, r. 16 (1) (b) did not empower the High Court to do so. In contrast with Order 42, r. 16 (1) (b) of L.N. 140A, the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.) Sched. II which now governs civil practice in district courts, by Order 41, rr. 7 and 8 specifically provide for the relief in these terms:
"7. The Court at the time of making any judgment or order, or at any time afterwards, may direct the time within which the payment or other act is to be made or done, reckoned from the date of the judgment or order, or from some other point of time, as the Court thinks fit, and may order interest at a rate not exceeding £5 per centum per annum to be paid upon any judgment, commencing from the date thereof or afterwards.
8. Where any judgment or order directs the payment of money, the Court may, for any sufficient reason, order that the amount shall be paid by instalments, with or without interest. Such order may be made at the time of giving judgment, or at any time afterwards by the same or any other Judge, Magistrate, or other judicial officer having the necessary jurisdiction, and may be rescinded upon sufficient cause at any time."
It is, I think, as it ought to be, that in the provisions governing district court practice the rules spell out the power to grant payment by instalments or stay of execution. For with the inferior court nothing is within its jurisdiction unless it is specifically so provided, whereas everything is within t
