The writ issued by the plaintiff, Dr. Ignatuis Lawrence Ohene-Djan, is endorsed with the following relief:
"The plaintiff's claim is for: an order of declaration that the plaintiff's trial for murder and subsequent conviction of manslaughter on 11 August 1975 is a nullity, void or voidable at the instance of the plaintiff as being contrary to law and fair trial; and constitute such legal irregularity which has occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice, thus such conviction, sentence and warrant of imprisonment be declared null and void, cancelled and set aside."
[p.215]
It was accompanied by a statement of claim in the material parts of which the plaintiff averred as follows:
"(3) That the plaintiff states that on or about 9 May 1975, the plaintiff was arrested at Sunyani by the police and subsequently accused of an offence of murder together with one other person.
(4) The plaintiff states that the then Chief Justice transferred the case from Sunyani to be tried in the Accra High Court.
(5) The plaintiff states that at the trial in the High Court in Accra, the plaintiff was put in charge of a jury of seven men to try and give a true verdict in the case as required by section 255 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), on 30 July 1975.
(6) That on 6 August 1975, when the prosecution closed their case after tendering a statutory statement made by the plaintiff, the trial High Court judge failed to consider and make a ruling whether the plaintiff had a case to answer as required by section 271 of Act 30.
(7) That on 8 August 1975, after the close of the case for the prosecution, counsel for the plaintiff asked the court to allow the plaintiff to rely on section 239 (2) of Act 30.
(8) The plaintiff states that after the trial judge had had discussions with the Director of Public Prosecutions and defence counsel, and without asking the plaintiff personally to plead guilty to a charge of manslaughter, the judge said: 'Dr. Ohene-Djan, so you are convicted of manslaughter of an unknown man . . .'
(9) The plaintiff states that at that stage of the trial, the judge had no right in law to allow the plaintiff to rely on section 239 (2) of Act 30.
(10) That again if the judge had such right at all, it was his legal responsibility to take the formal verdict of the jury emplanelled to try the plaintiff before formally convicting the plaintiff.
(11) That failure by the trial judge to take the verdict of the jury occasioned a fundamental miscarri
