OLLENNU J. The first plaintiff is the Omanhene (Paramount Chief) of Akyem Abuakwa, the second plaintiff is the Ohene (Divisional Chief) of Asafo Akyem. The defendant is an ex-Ohene (Divisional Chief) of the said Asafo Akyem. The subject-matter of the suit is a cocoa farm on a portion of the land of the said Asafo Akyem Stool.
In 1953 the third plaintiff instituted an action, suit No. 97/53. in the Akyem Abuakwa Native Court "A" against the defendant in respect of this farm. At that date the defendant was the occupant of the Akyem Asafo Stool and the action was against him, qua chief, that is to say, against the Stool of Asafo Akyem, represented, according to native custom, by the then occupant, who happened to be the defendant in the present case.
In the present suit the Stool of Asafo Akyem is one of the plaintiffs, and the defendant has been sued in his private or personal capacity. The defendant pleaded that the matter was res judicat,a by reason of the proceedings and judgment in suit No. 97/53. The trial Native Court upheld that plea, and dismissed the suit. From that ruling the plaintiffs have appealed to this court.
Mr. Lassey, for the defendant, when called upon to support the ruling properly submitted that he could not do so. Evidently the Akyem Abuakwa Native Court "A" found themselves unable to appreciate the difference between two personalities vested in one man. They seemed unable to understand that the defendant in suit No. 97/53 was the "Stool of Asafo Akyem" and not the private gentleman Kwame Boateng who then represented the stool; whereas in the present suit the Stool of Asafo Akyem is one of the plaintiffs and the defendant is Kwame Boateng, a private individual who is quite a different person from Badour Kwame Boateng, Ohene of Asafo Akyem.
In the majority of cases I have come across from Native Courts involving res judicata it has appeared that the principles of res judicata have often proved too technical for them, and have been obstacles over which 'they have often stumbled. It seems they are not to blame. Perhaps it may be advisable to relieve the Native Courts of the burden of such technicalities with which they are not quite familiar.
One small but very important point in this case also calls for comment. It is 'the interpretation which the Native Court seemed to place upon the Native Courts (Southern Ghana) Ordinance, s. 22. The Native Court appeared under this section to insist upon authority being given in writing by Nana
