NYARKO AND ANOTHER v. BANK OF GHANA

JUDGMENT OF HAYFRON-BENJAMIN J.

The plaintiffs by their writ of summons claim:

(a) a declaration that the plaintiffs' forced and involuntary resignations on 30 June 1967 were secured by the defendants in circumstances amounting to wrongful dismissal;

(b) reinstatement of the plaintiffs or in the alternative ¢100,000 (¢50,000 each) damages for wrongful dismissal of the plaintiffs by the defendants.

The plaintiffs filed a statement of claim in which they set out the grounds for their claims. Briefly their case is that the first plaintiff was until 30 June 1967 a senior clerk employed by the Bank of Ghana having risen from a clerical officer in 1959. He was on a salary of ¢1,400.00 per annum. The second plaintiff who was on a salary of ¢1,960.00 per annum was a confirmed grade II officer. Between August and September 1967, the first and second plaintiffs and others were arrested on complaints of stealing made against them by the defendants. They were arraigned before a circuit court but on 15 December 1967, they were discharged and made prosecution witnesses. While the case was pending in court, the defendants through the Governor of the Bank demanded and forced the resignation of the plaintiffs in circumstances amounting to wrongful dismissal. The first plaintiff was then 31 years of age and had served the bank for eight years. The second plaintiff was 28 years of age and had served the bank for two years. They claim that banking is a specialised career. They state in paragraph (8) of their statement of claim that:

"wherefore the first and second plaintiffs each claims ¢50,000 damages for wrongful dismissal made up as follows:

(i) Special damages:

(a) ¢320.04 being three months' salary in lieu of notice at ¢106.68 per month.

(b) ¢120.00 bonus payable on 30 June 1967.

(ii) general damages— ¢49,559.96."

Order 20, r. 4 of the Supreme [High] Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), provides that whenever a statement of claim is delivered the plaintiff may alter, modify or extend his claim without any amendment of the endorsement of the writ. Cargill v. Bower (1876) 4 Ch.D. 78 is authority for the proposition that where the plaintiff in his statement of claim drops any cause of action mentioned or any relief claimed on the writ, he will be deemed to have elected to abandon it. This was followed by Swinfen Eady J. in Lewis and Lewis v. Durnford (1907) 24 T.L.R. 64. The plaintiffs here make no mention of their claim for a declaration that they w