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JUDGEMENT
JUDGMENT OF ANTERKYI J.
In this case, the plaintiff claims by the endorsement on his writ,
"¢36,000.00 (£G15,000) damages against the first and second defendants jointly and severally for injuries, shock, pains, suffering, deformity, loss of earnings, capacity and damages as a result of the negligence of the first and second defendants by causing or permitting the vehicle No. GF 2516 property of the first defendant driven by the second defendant to be involved in an accident thereby causing severe injuries to the plaintiff whereby the plaintiff is now totally disabled and has incurred and suffered loss and damage as detailed in the statement of claim."
The accident had occurred on or about 6 November 1965, while the second defendant, as a servant of the first defendants, was driving the said vehicle of the first defendants, with the plaintiff aboard it, in the course of his employment.
[p.500]
The writ was filed on 19 January 1967 — about fourteen months and two weekends after the accident. By paragraph (8) of the statement of defence, the defendants contended that the action was statute-barred, and, upon this issue being raised as a preliminary objection when the case came on for hearing on 22 May 1967, Mr. Akiwumi, counsel for the defendants, contended that it was because, the first defendant, being a council, by section 133 of the Local Government Act, 1961 (Act 54), it is provided that:
“When any suit is commenced against any Council for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any enactment or of any public duties or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such enactment, duty or authority, the suit shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within twelve months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in the case of a continuance of damage or injury, within twelve months next after the ceasing thereof.”
The plaintiff by paragraph (4) of the reply had averred that:
“(a) The plaintiff denies paragraph (8) of the statement of defence and says that the plaintiff was under hard treatment and suffered great pains and complications in the injuries which continued in the Military Hospital till 12 October 1966, when the plaintiff was temporarily and conditionally discharged. Even further complications developed after briefing counsel on the facts and the plaintiff has again been re-admitted in hospital since 3 February 1967 and operated upon.
(b) The plaint