JUDGMENT OF SIRIBOE J.S.C.
Siriboe J.S.C. delivered the judgment of the court. This appeal is from the decision of Hayfron-Benjamin J. delivered on 11 January 1965, in an appeal brought before him from the Circuit Court, Accra.
The plaintiff as landlord of house No. 337, South Labadi Road Estate, claimed recovery of possession of the said house on the ground that he reasonably required it for the occupation of himself and his children. The house consists of two bedrooms, a sitting or living-room and a dining-room; all of which at the time of hearing, the defendant alone occupied, paying a monthly rent of £G3. This rent, as admitted by the defendant, is cheap considering the premises in question and the housing problem in Accra. That however, was not the ground for asking for possession, because, as further admitted by the defendant, the plaintiff had never at any time during the tenancy, suggested an increase of the rent to him. On the contrary, the evidence shows that some time between July and August 1962, the plaintiff notified the defendant that he required the house for himself and his family. This was because he has been living with four of his children (all girls) in his wife's house at Weija, from where he comes to work in Accra, which he described as inconvenient, because of the distance. His wife, according to him, has been persistently demanding [p.614] money from him. Furthermore, the plaintiff said he has no comfortable place to stay at Weija, and also one of his two sons had arrived back from studies overseas, and was experiencing difficulties in getting accommodation.
The trial circuit judge, his honour Judge Attoh (as he then was) in a well-considered judgment delivered on 20 July 1963, held inter alia that he was satisfied that the plaintiff’s grounds in support of his claim for recovery of possession were reasonable. He accordingly granted the defendant time up to 20 September 1963 to give up possession to the plaintiff.
From that judgment, the defendant appealed to the High Court, on the sole ground that the judgment was against the weight of evidence. The record shows that the learned judge, after hearing counsel for the plaintiff very briefly on the question of alternative accommodation, did not call upon defence counsel, but allowed the appeal without stating any reasons for his decision which is as follows:
“Per curiam:
Appeal allowed, judgment of the circuit court appealed against set aside. It is directed that judgment be e